America's mounting failures in the Middle East are tied not only to ineffective policies but also--and perhaps more importantly--to faulty assumptions about the sources of our difficulties in the region. Anti-American violence and terrorism is fueled by long-standing grievances, both real and perceived. A new Middle East strategy must be premised on a long-term effort to seek out root causes of this anger and, where possible, address them.

The Middle East today is consumed by political violence, autocracy, and extremism--a toxic mix that threatens American interests and regional stability. Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Saudi Arabia continue to exert undue influence. Despite the high-minded rhetoric of the 2007 Annapolis conference, Israeli-Palestinian peace seems as distant as ever. Meanwhile, Arab autocrats, many counted as American allies, are reasserting themselves, striking with increased ferocity at their domestic opponents and crushing dissent. The promise of early 2005, when Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia experienced democratic openings, is a rapidly fading memory. On the terrorism front, an April 2008 General Accountability Office report states that al Qaeda is regrouping in its safe haven on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Then there is Iraq, which, to put it mildly, still has a long way to go.

While there is a well-deserved consensus that the Bush administration has caused untold damage to our relationship with the Arab and Muslim world, it would be a mistake to think that eight years of Republican rule are an anomaly in an otherwise proud history of successful engagement. The reality is more troubling: American policy has been consistently self-defeating under administrations of both parties for more than five decades.

In practice, the United States has almost always been in crisis-management mode regarding the Middle East, seeing the region through a short-term strategic lens. Policymakers have focused on treating symptoms without addressing the deeper, structural causes that have produced so many of the region's ills--whether political violence, sectarianism, or terrorism. Fortunately, progressives are beginning to move in the right direction. There is little doubt that a new Democratic administration would repair our image and credibility in the international arena. There remains, however, a profound disconnect between the extent of our problems in the Middle East and the boldness needed to confront them. It is a dangerous illusion to think that multilateralism, diplomacy, and "restoring moral leadership" will, on their own, be enough to address the systemic problems of the region.

In this century, America's security is threatened as much by what happens within states as by what transpires between them. As a result, the attitudes of Arab and Muslim publics should weigh heavily as the next administration articulates its security strategy. Mistrust and suspicion of the United States--no matter its origin--fuels long-standing grievances. A new Middle East strategy must be premised on a concerted attempt to acknowledge America's misguided past efforts and reposition this nation as a fair-minded power in the region.

Notwithstanding their acute awareness of the Bush administration's failings in the Middle East, progressives have failed to offer a coherent vision for U.S. engagement in the region. To be sure, there are a host of excellent prescriptions on individual policy concerns--whether on Iran, Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, public diplomacy, or counterterrorism--but each issue tends to be treated in isolation, without reference to the others.

In short, America must reassess the core premises of its Middle East policy. With that in mind, this paper will challenge the assumptions that have long been the basis of U.S. policy formulation; reassess American security objectives in the region; and propose a set of practicable policy changes that embody a new mindset. This paper proposes, among other things:

• demilitarizing the fight against terror by putting more money into smart-power initiatives;
• elevating democracy promotion through aid conditionality;
• engaging nonviolent Islamist groups; and
• promoting Turkish accession into the European Union.