Remarks as delivered
Welcome to this briefing on "Progressive Internationalism: A Democratic National Security Strategy."
Let me start by giving a brief overview of what this document is, why we've done it, and who we are. Then we will hear from our special guests, Senators Joe Biden and Evan Bayh.
This document offers what we hope is a clear and compelling statement of the Democratic Party's view on how to best meet the threats facing our country today -- for making Americans safer and restoring America's authority and leadership in the world.
What we've tried to do in this document is to update the tradition in our party of tough-minded internationalism. That's the tradition of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, of Jack Kennedy and Bill Clinton, and other great Democratic presidents who understood that America is always safer when we work with likeminded countries that share our values and try to create international systems and institutions to create a world more congenial to our interests and our values. So we offer this statement today as a first draft for a Democratic Party platform.
Well, who are we? This is a collaborative enterprise that began about four or five months ago in a series of conversations among the people that you see here and some who are not here. We all believe this party has an opportunity to make a forceful statement about its own views on national security. When we started this -- the situation didn't look quite as bad as it looks for this administration's national security policies today -- but we thought that particularly with the presidential election and the prospect that we're going to have the first election since the Cold War era in which security is dominant, that this party really has to set forth very clearly where we stand and offer an alternative strategy.
So we got together and started thinking and writing about that, and it's been a great privilege to work with the people that you see here. This is a group of very creative and experienced national security analysts. Most of them held very high posts in the Clinton administration during the '90s, and I believe -- and I can say this because I'm really the exception to the rule -- they represent a new generation of Democratic leaders who are going be in high policymaking positions in the next Democratic administration. I should make clear this is not a PPI document. We were the convener for this discussion, and several of us have made contributions to it.
Now, why did we write this: I think first of all we've become alarmed by the administration's growing catalogue of foreign policy failures. It's not just Iraq -- that's the most visible and obvious case -- but also the failure to put any real check on North Korea's dangerous nuclear ambitions; Iran's drive for weapons of mass destruction; the collapse of the Middle East roadmap; the absence of a long-term political and economic strategy for winning the war on terrorism; serious gaps in our homeland security that have yet to be plugged; and fiscal and trade policies that we think are undermining the economic foundations for strong American leadership in the world.
But the biggest mistake of all is the dangerous detour that the Bush administration has taken America on -- onto the path of unilateralism, a go-it-alone policy that has helped convert what was a tremendous outpouring of goodwill toward America right after the September 11th terrorist attacks into an unprecedented wave of anti-Americanism that's helped to isolate our country and made it harder for us to secure the cooperation of key friends and allies and international institutions to achieve our security goals, and has left us virtually alone to bear the risk and the cost of policies that are not going to only benefit the United States but should benefit our democratic allies generally. We believe these policies are not making us safer and we've got to change course.
Secondly, we wanted to draw a sharp distinction between this mainstream Democratic strategy for national security and the far left's vision of America's role in the world. In this document we take issue with those who begrudge the kind of defense spending that we think is necessary to meet our needs, both at home and abroad; with folks who seem to reflexively oppose the use of force; and who seem incapable of taking America's side in international disputes.
We also argue strong international leadership should not be equated with a kind of toothless multilateralism that puts the quest for consensus above the hard and risky business of grappling with chaos, of dealing with real conflicts, and confronting real enemies and aggressors. And we warn against an anti-globalization agenda that not only hurts our economy but that condemns developing countries in the world to poverty. So, however troubling the Bush record is, we think that the pacifist and protectionist left offers no viable alternative.
But the most important reason we've done this is that we think Democrats have a responsibility to offer their own plans for making America safer. As I mentioned earlier, there seems to be eroding public confidence in this administration, in its ability, its capacity to handle these difficult national security challenges, and its credibility. People are just not so sure they can trust what is coming out of this White House.
But it is not enough for Democrats to criticize the Bush administration. That alone won't allay the doubts that many have about our own party's capacity to meet these new threats. So in this document we've tried to lay out a clear alternative, a much more ambitious strategy that does more, that goes beyond what the Bush administration has proposed to win this war on terror and to meet the other security challenges that we lay out in this document. And it's also -- and this I think is terribly important -- a declaration of the Democratic Party's basic principles on national security. Because, frankly, in Washington we always have a tendency to speak in terms of policies and programs and not values, so let me just take a second to highlight the three core convictions that I think drive this analysis.
First, the Democrats who've signed this paper believe in national strength and the bold exercise of American power to advance our interests and our values. Democratic presidents have always backed a strong national defense. After all, this president inherited the force that won brilliant victories in Afghanistan and in Iraq from his Democratic predecessor. We believe that effective diplomacy has to be backed by the credible threat of force, and that's why the signers of this document supported the use of force against Saddam Hussein, why we believe that we need to see this difficult mission through to its conclusion. We think this is not time for cutting and running; this is the time to stay and to win.
But we also believe that this administration has focused too narrowly and exclusively on the military instrument of America's power to the neglect of our many other vital strengths: a dynamic economy, energetic diplomacy, and the broad appeal of the democratic values that we've always championed. And we think ultimately the war on terror won't be won in a strictly or narrowly military sense, just as the Cold War was not a military victory for the United States. It will be a political victory. And we don't see this administration putting in place the kind of long-range strategy we need to win it. In this document we elaborate our ideas on that.
Secondly, we believe in a values-based foreign policy, unapologetic about using American power to defend and promote liberal democracy in the world. We believe this is in America's strategic interests; it's not just a reflection of idealism. It is the spread and institutionalization of democratic values that makes the world a safer place. It's no accident that the great threats we face today arise outside the zone of liberal democratic market societies. And we agree with Tony Blair, who, in his speech to Congress earlier this year said, "The spread of freedom is the best security for the free. It's our last line of defense and our first line of attack."
Now, we hear this president talking about promoting democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere, and this is something we should celebrate. That is, if the Republicans are becoming late converts to the point of view that America's values count in our foreign policy, we should say welcome to the fold, and we are determined not to cede the high ground of values to them.
And third and finally, U.S. international leadership. The neoconservative assumption seems to be that America's growing military power has created a large power gap that means we're so strong we no longer need allies or the support of the international community. It seems to us that the events in Iraq and elsewhere have proved that theory dead wrong. Leadership is not a favor the United States does to the rest of the world; it's something that's been thrust on us by virtue of our success and strength as a nation and our historic status as the beacon of democracy. It is also the smartest way for us to defend our country, working through alliances and global institutions that entrench democratic norms and values in this world. This helps amplify our voice and extend our reach and to legitimate our actions in the eyes of the rest of the world.
By the way, this is something that the American people deeply believe. Virtually every poll on Iraq or any other issue shows that the American people are instinctive internationalists. They don't want to go it alone. They strongly support internationalizing the conflict in Iraq and getting this nation back on the path of leadership and off this go-it-alone course.
So, we're confident that a new democratic strategy that's grounded in the Democratic Party tradition of tough-minded internationalism can keep Americans safer than the go-it-alone policies of this administration that have alienated our natural allies and overstretched our resources.
Blueprint Keywords: Extra Security Strategy
