Introduction

On the ground and in the skies above Afghanistan, decades of effort to integrate battlefield information systems have paid dividends in the war against terrorism. Army and Marine ground troops, Navy and Air Force pilots, and distant joint command centers now communicate easily via common systems, sharing fresh targeting information in real time, while bombs and missiles launched by pilots from 20,000 feet are then guided by hand-held lasers on the ground with deadly precision.

At the same time, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks have uncovered the costly lack of integration in our domestic defense efforts. Consider:

• Prior to September 11, a number of the hijackers turned up on the radar screen of local law enforcement or government attention. Some were issued driver's licenses under false identities, two were arrested for drunk driving, another was the subject of a misdemeanor arrest warrant, and yet another was apparently stopped by a state trooper just days prior to the attacks. In each of these cases, their names were entered into state government or local criminal justice-related data systems. Meanwhile, the FBI was seeking to locate at least two of these individuals, and some of their names apparently were also being tracked in other intelligence databases. Unfortunately, because these various information systems are not sufficiently interlinked and maintained, the chance to potentially disrupt some of the hijackers was lost.
• On September 11, when police and fire departments from Arlington County, Va., Montgomery County, Md., and the District of Columbia responded to the Pentagon terrorist attack, they were unable to communicate with each other using their own radios. Why? Most individual public safety entities operate individual radio systems that utilize different frequencies.

As the examples indicate, the nation's law enforcement and emergency response systems are largely tied to geographical jurisdictions or to specific functions, and as a result do not function cohesively. These and other lessons growing out of the Sept. 11 attacks and their aftermath should guide policymakers as they scramble to bolster the nation's ability to defend against and respond to terrorism.

First, we must redefine our concept of national security. We can no longer afford to think of national security as the sole province of the military, or even the federal government's intelligence, law enforcement, and border control agencies. Keeping America safe from terrorists and responding when they elude our defenses is also the urgent task of state and local law enforcement and response agencies.

Second, our approach to domestic defense must be national and seamless. To this end, we must improve information sharing with our front line law enforcement officers, either to bring in suspected terrorists or disrupt their plans by catching them in unrelated crimes. Similarly, as the example above also illustrates, we need new communications systems that permit emergency response agencies to coordinate as easily here at home as our troops do abroad. Public health systems need critical information systems to detect outbreaks of bio-terrorism and surge capacity if they succeed.

Third, as weeks turn to months, one thing has become clear: The nation has neither the stamina nor the resources to continue operating indefinitely in an "emergency response" mode. We must find a new way of conducting the business of government that makes domestic defense a top priority in the everyday work of government, not just on emergency footing. If we do so, all law enforcement functions and overall public safety will benefit.

Domestic defense is a national priority that must be pursued at every level of government. The federal government must recognize not only its own need to improve the coordination of federal agencies, but also must set clear national priorities to guide action for states and localities. States must ramp up to the task quickly and together, rather than be left to their own pace, political idiosyncrasies, and resources. This coordination should be a top priority for the director of intergovernmental affairs at the Office of Homeland Security. Congress must also provide state and local governments with financial assistance to ensure implementation, using block grants with accountability measures.

Clearly, federal agencies -- from the FBI to the border patrol -- will play critical roles in our domestic defense. But inevitably, responsibility for future homeland defense efforts will rest primarily upon the states and their localities, given their central role in providing for public safety, civil defense, and public health. The first person on the scene of a domestic terrorist incident will be a police officer. Local firefighters and emergency medical technicians will conduct rescue operations and provide medical care at the scene of an attack. Community-based heath care and social service entities will provide short-term, continuing care, and social service support to victims and the victims' families. Local telephone systems including 9-1-1 will become overwhelmed due to a large volume of traffic. Local roadways will become clogged and public utility service may be interrupted.

Though terrorist attacks create confusion and overload response systems, we must resist the temptation to create operational and technology infrastructures that are only mobilized in response to a critical incident or terrorist attack. Instead, we must build on ongoing state and local initiatives such as police partnerships and statewide information sharing and communication capabilities. The goal should be improved service on a day-to-day basis, while recognizing that this infrastructure will serve as the foundation for efforts to prevent and/or respond to critical incidents and terrorist attacks.

State and local governments should develop a comprehensive strategy to address these and other important issues related to the prevention of, and response to, critical incidents. This strategy should include an assessment of potential targets for attack (buildings, water works, power plants, and so on) and a detailed response plan that includes how federal, state, local, and private entities will work together to prevent and/or respond to critical incidents. This strategy should include both immediate and long-term action plans, identify key components of the response system, and establish key systems that are needed to support the response to such critical incidents.

To this end, this paper recommends a variety of actions, including these four concrete steps:

• Launch "integrated justice" inform-ation systems to link the information from various arms of the criminal justice system about the people who commit crime and the places where crime occurs. Efforts underway in 38 states and the District of Columbia must be accelerated and made universal.
• Integrate emergency response com-munications systems so first responders from different agencies and juris-dictions can talk to each other as easily as the troops in Afghanistan. The state of Maryland has launched a pilot project to patch disparate radio systems into an integrated network that offers a model for the way forward.
• Establish a coordinated surveillance, identification, containment, and re-sponse system designed to minimize the effects of a biological and/or chemical attack. The Lightweight Epidemiology Advanced Detection & Emergency Response System (LEADERS) deployed by some hos-pitals and state medical offices in New York and Phoenix during this year's World Series is a good first step that can be expanded to improve detection capabilities.
• Make it easier for the public to call for help or information without jamming 9-1-1 lines with a clearly identifiable phone number such as the 2-1-1 system being deployed in some locales.

Blueprint Keywords: Extra State Security Extra Security

John D. Cohen is president and CEO of PSComm, LLC, and director of the Progressive Policy Institute's Community Crime Fighting Project. John Adams Hurson is a member of the Maryland House of Delegates, where he serves as chairman of the Environmental Matters Committee.