Executive Summary

Understanding The Revolution in Military Affairs is the Progressive Policy Institute's third contribution to the emerging debate on the future of America's military. Its proposals may be controversial because, if accepted, they would lead over the next decade to a force that differs considerably in size, structure, and operations from the one the United States has today. It draws heavily from ideas, concepts, and suggestions that have circulated inside the Pentagon for several years and are increasingly of interest outside. And while it is unlikely that the Defense Department will go as far as the paper in drawing out the size and structure implications of these ideas, we believe that illuminating what they mean for our military force structure, organization, and future defense budget is essential to the defense debate. Indeed, it is what inspired 1996 legislation calling for an independent National Defense Commission to examine such questions.

This paper seeks to take the concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and outline the implications of a military force based on exploiting the new possibilities of high tech Information Age systems. The case for moving to the new force is based on different assumptions than the prevalent "two major regional conflict" planning scenarios. The assumption in this paper is that the likelihood of more than one major regional conflict over the next five years is sufficiently low that we have a window of opportunity to capitalize on our comparative advantages in high technology.

Background

The world has changed profoundly in the last seven years. However, the design, structure, organization, and character of U.S. military forces has not. America's military has of course evolved, and what exists now differs in some important respects from what existed at the end of the Cold War largely as a consequence of downsizing the Cold War force structure. The numbers of active duty military personnel have been reduced by roughly 30 percent over the last seven years. New equipment has replaced older instruments of war, and new kinds of equipment have entered the inventories.

To date, the public debate on defense has been more about politics than strategy. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the difference between the Republican Congress and the Clinton Administration on defense spending is less than 2 percent, and there is little evidence of competing visions--or, for that matter, little suggestion of much vision at all--on where the Defense Department ought to be going.

This now may be about to change. Driven by a growing sense that it is no longer enough--nor sensible--to continue to shave down a military structure built for the Cold War, the United States is beginning an in-depth discussion of the nation's military needs for the next century. The first "Quadrennial Strategy Review," a congressionally mandated reassessment of defense policy, began formally in January 1997, and much of Washington's security policy community--inside and outside the Pentagon--is gearing up for it. The nascent debate is emerging from a growing sense that, however useful the Bush and Clinton Administrations' efforts were to manage the transition into a post-Cold War era, the challenge of designing a military force to meet the threats of a new era lies ahead.

Proposal

Moving to the RMA force would involve rapid and significant reorganization-- particularly within the nation's ground forces--and accelerated integration of new technology to the active forces. Getting there would require significant changes in the current role and activity of reserve components. It would require shifting defense funding across programs and across military services, and would involve reductions in the annual defense budget--currently running at about $245 billion a year--to about $210 billion by early in the next century.

The more controversial steps along such a path include the following changes:

• Reducing the size of today's ground forces in order to accelerate the organizational changes necessary to take full advantage of new technologies.
• Accelerating infrastructure consolidation; privatizing and out-sourcing procurement.
• Relying more heavily on reserve components for operations other than war, for "engagement," and for presence missions.
• Accelerating the introduction of new naval platforms while reducing some fleet components.
• Reducing air power redundancy with greater mission specialization and force integration. This would involve:
  • Reducing air defenses assets currently maintained by U.S. ground forces;
  • Integrating fully Navy and Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft, and focusing the resulting "naval aviation" on air defenses of ground (and naval) forces, close air support, and battlefield interdiction;
  • Focusing Air Force tactical aircraft on long-range strike, offensive counter-air operations, and air defense.

Only by joining this debate today will the United States be able to make the fundamental decisions necessary to build America's 21st century military force.

Blueprint Keywords: Extra RMA

James R. Blaker was the Senior Advisor to the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral William A. Owens). Previously, he held positions as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Analysis, Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force, and Personal Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the MBFR Negotiations.