Civil society groups 1 are a growing force
in international politics, as evidenced by the thousands of activists planning on attending
an upcoming meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO). While the emergence of
this "third sector" in global politics is to be broadly welcomed, these groups are not democratically elected governments. Their active participation in global politics and global institutions should thus be clearly defined and differentiated from that of national governments. In short, they should be given a voice in the debate but not a formal vote. Three principles for shaping the role of civil society participation in the WTO are suggested--mutual responsibility (accountability in return for participation), an institutionalized voice, and global representation (broadening civil society participation to the developed world).
The emergence of civil society groups claiming to represent "society"--rather than governments or business interests--has become an increasingly important feature of
global politics. For example, Public Citizen--a consumer advocacy group--describes itself as
"the consumer's eyes and ears" and proudly claims on its Web site "we stand up for you against thousands of special interest lobbyists in Washington."2 This group recently produced a publication entitled "A Citizen's Guide to the World Trade Organization."
Yet such civil society groups are overwhelmingly based in, and representative of,
developed countries. For example, of the 1,550 NGOs registered with the
United Nations, only 251 are based in developing countries.3 Indeed, the WTO--with its 134 members; a voting structure based on one member, one vote; and a process of making decisions by consensus rather than majority vote--is more broadly democratic and representative than any civil society group or coalition.
Nevertheless, thousands of representatives from non-governmental organizations
around the world are expected to attend and protest the third ministerial meeting of the WTO
being held in Seattle at the end of November.4 These
well-organized, media-savvy groups are likely to get a lot of attention for their largely
anti-globalization, anti-WTO and anti-big business message. Indeed, a similar international coalition of civil society groups recently prevented the adoption of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. These groups argued that the MAI placed the interests of multinational corporations above those of workers, the environment and "ordinary people." Their Internet-based, grassroots campaign raised sufficient concern within several national governments that the MAI negotiations were eventually unceremoniously dropped.
Such increased global activism by NGOs is itself in part a result of the march of
globalization--the removal of barriers, the empowerment of individuals, and the
increased volume of international trade and investment impacting on everyday lives. The civil
society movement must therefore be seen as part of a longer-term structural change in the
landscape of global politics: Civil society activism on the global stage is here to stay.
The emergence of this "third sector" in global policy debates (in addition to
government and the business community) is to be broadly encouraged and welcomed. These groups play several constructive roles. First, NGOs can provide a voice for groups affected by globalization. Indeed, the NGOs playing an active role in international politics form a very broad church. They include environmentalists, human rights activists, trade unionists, religious groups,
communists, animal rights activists, students and women's groups, to name a few. On the trade policy front, many of the criticisms of globalization raised by these groups reflect genuine, deep-seated concerns about the nature of the global economy and its impact on society--particularly on weak or marginalized groups.
Second, these groups can form part of a more flexible, collaborative approach to
global policy questions, particularly as they often bring issue- or country-specific knowledge
and expertise to the table. For example, the WTO recently hosted a high-level symposium
on trade and the environment, which was attended by representatives of government and over a
hundred organizations from the business community and civil society. This meeting was useful
in bringing different perspectives to the table and highlighting areas of agreement in a
debate that is often highly fractious.
Third, NGOs have played important "front-line" roles in solving international
problems. This "civic diplomacy" includes administering development aid and assistance and responding to humanitarian crises.5 However, it can also include civic involvement in efforts to improve corporate behavior, such as in the areas of labor and environmental standards. For example, local NGOs were involved in a joint project with Levi Strauss in Bangladesh that established community schools for children under the age of 14 to provide them with a real alternative to factory work.6
Yet NGOs often seem to be demanding an equal place in WTO policy deliberations,
alongside national governments.7 This raises
fundamental questions about representation (who do NGOs represent?), accountability (how do they form their opinions?), and thus legitimacy (why should they have a seat at the table?).
Representation. By one simple measure--public opinion--many civil
NGOs are not "representative." Indeed, the strongly anti-trade and anti-globalization views propounded by many of these groups do not coincide that closely with the actual views of the general public. In several years of polling the American public on trade, one pollster has concluded a constant majority--always roughly 60 percent--supports free trade agreements.8 This view is held across different generations of voters and by those in virtually all sectors of the economy.9 NGOs actively campaigning against trade agreements and the WTO thus speak only for their members or supporters, not the general public.
Another aspect of "representation" is membership. Yet looking closely at the list of civil society signatories on the petition against a new trade round, it is clear that there are a
wide range of different groups. There are large, well-known, membership-based groups. These can be nationally based, such as the United Kingdom's Green Party, or international, such as
Friends of the Earth. There are also membership-based groups that are very small and very local,
such as the Salzburg Forum Against the MAI in Austria. For these membership-based groups,
representation is a fairly straightforward concept--the group represents the views and
interests of its members. The right of these groups to a seat at the table thus depends partly on the size and scope of their membership.
However, there are also large, well-known organizations without a
direct membership base, such as Oxfam and Christian Aid. Similarly, there are many
hard-to-define organizations such as think tanks and specialist policy organizations.
For these groups, representation is a more subtle concept--the groups represent the
views of their supporters and trustees. However representation is achieved, NGOs need to
recognize the limits of their representation. Civil society groups are less broadly
representative than most governments and many international bodies and their role is thus to
influence rather than make decisions.
Accountability. A group is accountable if it is clear to outsiders and
members alike how it develops its policy positions. For membership-based groups, this will probably mean a democratic process. For groups without a membership base, this will again mean a more subtle definition. In their book, Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post Cold War World, Michael Edwards and David Hulme argue that accountability is never perfect but involves elements such as a statement of goals, transparency of decision-making, honest reporting of resource use, and an appraisal process. They also state "we can find no evidence that the contemporary accountability of NGOs is satisfactory."10 Thus, international
institutions such as the WTO should expect NGOs to improve their accountability in future in return for greater involvement in policy deliberations.
Legitimacy. Legitimacy may be defined as the right to a seat at the table.
Not all NGOs should have the right to influence the workings of all international institutions.
Each institution will need to develop a "test" of legitimacy to determine which NGOs are eligible to be actively involved in their policy debates. For example, the U.N. requires that NGOs work in a field related to the work of the U.N. in order to receive formal status. Similarly, the WTO could be expected to limit NGO input to those NGOs that work on issues related to trade. However, passing a legitimacy test requires more than proof of relevance to the debate.
Legitimacy combines representation and accountability (as outlined above) with technical expertise, legal compliance, oversight by trustees, and recognition by legitimate actors (governments, other groups etc.).
The following section describes a framework for formalizing the relationship
between NGOs and the WTO, taking into account these issues of representation, accountability, and legitimacy.
The need to actively involve civil society in the workings of international
institutions is not a new phenomenon--NGOs have been interested in trade at least since the creation of the GATT in 1947--but it has taken on a greater urgency in recent years. As President Clinton noted in his recent speech to the Democratic Leadership Council, "all over the world, when issues come up, a lot of people....have some legitimate question or legitimate interest in being heard in the debate." Fundamental questions remain, however, as to how civil society should be integrated into the WTO structure and what those groups will be expected to provide in return for a seat at the table.
The founding charter of the World Trade Organization includes a mandate to
"make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO."12 In October 1996, the General Council of the WTO adopted a set of guidelines to further clarify the relationship between civil society groups and the global trade body. These included pledges to publish a larger number of WTO documents, to establish informal arrangements to receive input from NGOs and to hold ad hoc symposia on issues of interest to civil society (such as the High Level Symposium on trade and the environment earlier this year).
Despite these steps, many NGOs feel that the WTO remains closed to NGOs in
important respects. For example, panel dispute hearings are closed to the public and they do not
have to accept "friend of the court" briefs from interested outside parties. Similarly, in the new round of trade negotiations that will be undertaken after the Seattle ministerial, NGOs still have no institutionalized input into deliberations at the international level. In response to these arguments, several governments, including the Clinton Administration, have called for
increased civil society participation at the WTO. However, few commentators have outlined how this would be achieved. The approach outlined here suggests three principles for
integrating NGO activity into global fora such as the WTO--mutual responsibility; an institutionalized voice, not a right to vote; and broad representation.
One model for establishing a sense of mutual responsibility between NGOs and the
WTO is that used by the United Nations. Under U.N. rules for relations with civil society, NGOs
apply formally for "status." There are three categories of status reflecting the different types of civil so ciety groups: general consultative status (for large NGOs whose work covers most areas of UN activity); special consultative status (for NGOs with specific competence in a given field); and roster status (for NGOs that may be able to make occasional but useful contributions to the U.N.'s work).
Once they have been approved for one of these categories, civil society groups then
have certain rights. The rights vary depending on the category of status but they include
things such as timely access to documents (such as agendas), observer status at the General Council, the right to submit brief written statements on subjects of interest to them (which are then circulated by the U.N.), the right to place items on the agenda and the right to request informal discussions on areas of interest.
In order to be eligible for such access, NGOs must meet certain criteria. For
example, their work must relate to the activities of the U.N., they must have a "democratically adopted" constitution (with a copy deposited at the U.N. headquarters), they must have a representative
structure (formal voting or a similar transparent decision-making process), they must
be more than two years old, they must have an established headquarters and executive officer, they must derive most of their resources from national affiliates or members and they must provide documentation regarding all financial donations from voluntary contributions. Perhaps more importantly, NGOs must submit a report on their activities to the U.N. every 4 years. Thus, civil society groups are asked to provide continual evidence of their accountability (institutional structure, fund-raising and relevance to the U.N.) in order to maintain their formal status.
The WTO has adopted a limited version of this approach for the ministerial meeting
in Seattle in its pr ocess of registering civil society groups for formal observer status.
However, the WTO needs to go further in two respects. First, it needs to extend the certification
process beyond periodic meetings (such as the ministerials) to cover its day-to-day affairs.
Second, the WTO application process requires little mutual responsibility or transparency on the
part of the NGOs. That is, once an NGO has applied, it will in all likelihood be approved for
"status." If civil society groups are to be given a permanent voice in the WTO, they should be required to provide their share of transparency and information.
The WTO is an intergovernmental institution. It was created by elected
governments and it is a forum in which governments negotiate new policies and settle disputes. At present, decisions are made through consensus between the 134 member states. Though there
may be some concerns as to whether consensus is the best way to make decisions with so many
members, the fact remains that the decisions are and should continue to be taken by the
member governments.
The role for civil society is thus to influence, advise, and help shape those
decisions--just as civil society groups do at the national level. This needs to be done in a formal,
institutionalized manner (through participation in meetings, submitting papers, etc.) and not through voting power.
Of the 1,550 NGOs registered with the United Nations, only 251 are based in
developing countries. Similarly, only 25 percent of the NGOs registered with the U.N. Committee on Trade and Development are from developing countries.13 Clearly, then, civil society groups in poorer and less developed nations face unequal access to the policy dialogue. Even though some of the NGOs based in developed countries claim to speak for citizens of other countries, the imbalance of representation is great enough to suggest a potential problem of legitimacy for international institutions. Indeed, many societal groups in developing countries have very different agendas and priorities (if not different overall objectives) than their counterparts in the developed world. Simply creating a formal mechanism for the recognition of civil society groups at the WTO will not overcome this imbalance of representation.
In addition, international institutions, NGOs and governments will need to engage
in capacity building in developing countries--at both the government and the civil society level--to ensure that a wide range of viewpoints from developing countries are expressed. This may involve the transfer of resources, as well as technical expertise and information. A shorter-term solution is for developing countries with similar positions to combine resources and expertise and speak as a group on specific issues. In the long-run, continued economic growth and development will help provide a standard of living and income capable of supporting the level of civil society activism in developing countries that we are already witnessing in the developed world. Until then, it is in the interests of the WTO to ensure that it is receiving input from all aspects of civil society and not just groups from developed countries.
Activism by NGOs in global politics is likely to become a permanent feature of the
global economy. While it is to be welcomed and encouraged as a means of increasing the
legitimacy of, and support for, global rules and institutions, the "third sector" needs to be integrated into the debate in a formal and clearly defined manner. NGOs have a separate and different role to play from that of government--one based on a voice not a vote. They need to carry their share of mutual responsibility, accountability, and legitimacy if they are to be constructive voices in the shaping of policy.
