In the last quarter-century, the number of democracies in the world has nearly tripled,
from 40 to 117. This should be good news, but there's a catch: Many of these regimes are
illiberal democracies.
Illiberal democracies have regular, more or less "free and fair" elections,
but they lack some of the underpinnings of liberal democracy: civilian supremacy over the
military, an independent judiciary, a free parliament, a constitution that protects
liberties, and a vigorous civil society.
It is these deeper structures of democracy, not the mere fact of elections, that
constrain governments' conduct at home and abroad. The adage that democracies rarely go to
war with each other applies only to truly liberal democracies, which are more likely to
treat their own citizens with dignity, to resolve disputes by peaceful means, to cooperate
with other nations, and to adhere to international treaties and norms of achievement.
It follows that there is no more important condition for international peace and
security today - and thus for America's national security - than helping to develop the
institutions and values of liberal democracy.
More than 60 percent of the world's nations have some form of democratic government.
Many of the remaining countries' lack the conditions for a democratic transition, at least
in the short run. That means that we are unlikely to witness a repeat anytime soon of the
transformative surge in the number of democracies that were spawned by the end of the Cold
War. Nonetheless, the next administration will face huge challenges: how to deepen and
consolidate the new and tentative democracies of the third wave, such as Brazil, South
Africa, Thailand, and the Philippines; how to prevent the erosion and breakdown of
particularly troubled democracies, such as Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Venezuela; how to
foster favorable conditions for democratic change in the remaining authoritarian
countries, most notably China but also including Cuba, Burma, Egypt, Iran, and the Congo;
how to strengthen the commitment of the United Nations and other international and
regional bodies to preserving and protecting democratic institutions and values. Through
the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and
independent groups like the National Endowment for Democracy and the Asia Foundation, the
U.S. government is spending an estimated $400 million each year to assist democratic
transitions around the world. That sounds like a lot until one considers that it is only
one-tenth of one percent of what we spend on defense. In fact, we should spend more. The
spread of liberal democracy creates a world that is friendlier to American interests and
values and thus safer - a crucial investment in our long-term security.
Consolidating liberal democracy requires the hard, methodical work of institution
building. New democracies need help in modernizing legal codes; training lawyers,
prosecutors, judges, and legal aid officers; establishing legislative research services
and counter-corruption agencies; enhancing the skills of local, elected councilors and
mayors; making political parties more internally transparent and democratic; diffusing
methods of dialogue and negotiation to build consensus behind needed market reforms;
cultivating the tools and ethics of energetic but responsible news media; and crafting
effective curricula for education in democratic citizenship.
Here is a brief survey of democratic prospects around the world:
Europe
First in Southern Europe, and now in Central and Eastern Europe, a powerful incentive
has been the prospect of integration into the great security and economic communities of
the West: NATO and the European Union. No external force will do more to secure and deepen
democracy in the region than continuing integration. This is the single most compelling
rationale (beyond even the need to enhance regional security) for NATO enlargement. What
matters most for the new Europe is continued economic integration and reform on both sides
of the old East-West divide. We should use the powerful incentive of membership in the
Western economic club - and the lure of Western investment - to push for market reforms in
the liberalizing societies of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, we should support
enlargement of the European Union to include those countries that meet the criteria of
political and economic reform.
It is also crucial that we remain engaged with the successor states of the former
Soviet Union. There, democracy is generally on much weaker ground, and many regimes have
reverted to authoritarian rule behind an electoral fagade. However, several countries,
such as Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia, are struggling to institutionalize democratic
elections as the only acceptable means for achieving power. Now is the time to encourage,
monitor, and assist these difficult long-term processes of democratic change, not to
dismiss and abandon them.
The Americas
In the Americas, the next frontier for regional integration is to enlarge the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into a hemispheric free-trade zone. This is a
daunting challenge that will require extraordinary vision and persuasive power by a new
U.S. president, but economic good times are the right time to make such a move. Removing
barriers to free trade throughout the Americas will do more than stimulate economic
growth; opening markets will also promote political reform and modernization. By
de-nationalizing banks and industries, opening highly regulated sectors to competition,
and adopting more rigorous fiscal and monetary policies, many Latin American countries
have also undermined the power of old political oligarchies. And since a new
Inter-American Free Trade Agreement (IFTA) would require more uniform labor and
environmental standards, it would strengthen efforts to promote social justice and
government responsiveness in the emergent democracies of the region.
In 1991, the Organization of American States (OAS) took an important step toward the
collective defense of democracy by adopting the Santiago Resolution, providing for
immediate consultations and action in the event of the overthrow of a democratic
government. Because of the automatic sanctions that are now invoked, both by the United
States unilaterally and by the OAS collectively (as well as by the European states),
blatant military coups have been deterred or reversed (in Guatemala and Paraguay, for
example). Ironically, the principal threat to democracy in the region now comes from
elected civilian presidents. Among these are: Alberto Fujimori, who suspended the Congress
and then abused human rights in Peru; and Hugo Chavez, the leader of a 1992 military coup
attempt who is shaping a new constitution to aggrandize his power in Venezuela. The OAS
needs to draw the line at such attempts to construct semi-authoritarian rule behind a
civilian constitutional facade. Countries that flout democratic principles should stand at
risk of suspension from the OAS and from the prospective IFTA as well.
Africa
Now is the time for a new bargain between Africa and the West that could strengthen
democratic structures by swapping debt for democracy and development for good governance.
The dependence of African states on international aid, finance, and investment makes it
possible to provide tangible incentives for liberalizing reforms and to impose penalties
on those regimes that cling to corrupt and abusive practices. Aid should be conditioned on
economic liberalization, political freedom, and accountability. Emphasis should be placed
on redirection of budgetary priorities away from military and other unproductive spending
and toward human and physical capital. Governments that are committed to strengthening
markets and political pluralism deserve more aid, including debt relief. Governments that
waffle on these commitments should be denied international aid and loans. Even in the most
authoritarian situations, however, the international community needs to seek out and
support the civil society groups that are actively engaged in development,
democratization, and accountability.
Since a disproportionate share of Africa's 18 or so democracies lie in southern Africa,
that end of the continent now has a unique opportunity for regional democratic development
and cooperation, which we should support. In addition, we should encourage African
democracies to drop their rhetoric of "non-intervention" concerning other
members of the Organization of African States; within their own ranks, they should press
issues and standards of democracy, human rights, and honest government.
Asia
Ultimately, the creation of a democratic world depends in no small measure on the
creation of a democratic China. This will be one of the most difficult foreign-policy
challenges for the next several administrations, and it requires a careful, steady balance
between principle and a pragmatic, long-term vision. If China is going to develop
democracy, it must continue to develop economically. Even as China represses dissent,
economic development is creating a more sophisticated, attentive, pluralistic, and
autonomously organized society. This is fertile ground for long-term democratic change.
For this reason, in part, nothing will be gained for democracy or other U.S. interests by
using trade as a weapon to punish China for its reprehensible record on human rights.
However, there must be a principled track to our policy that seeks to expose and condemn
China's grave violations of human rights, while working privately as well as in
international forums to end outrageous practices. There must also be an
institution-building track, which quietly works with a variety of Chinese actors to
improve legal training and procedures, the administration of competitive elections at the
local level, and the capacities of organizations outside the state.
Despite Asia's image as a bastion of authoritarian values, democracy is gaining
momentum. Throughout the region, especially in such crucial countries as South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines, the United States should actively support political
and economic reforms designed to strengthen the judicial process, enhance governmental and
corporate accountability, empower civil society, and improve international
competitiveness. We must stay engaged with Indonesia to encourage a complete transition to
democracy.
Collective Action for Democracy
The Clinton administration deserves credit for winning greater international acceptance
of democracy and human rights as the standards of political legitimacy. In April 1999, for
example, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution (with only Cuba and
China abstaining) affirming democracy as a human right and asking the United Nations to
promote and consolidate democracy around the world.
Yet progress toward creating regional and international structures for the promotion of
democracy is not likely to come through aggressive, high-profile American initiatives. Our
status as the lone superpower, with a sense of mission and a colossal
military-technological advantage, generates widespread resentment around the world.
Overzealous U.S. efforts would likely be rejected even by our allies as expressions of
hegemonic ambition. Rather, the promotion of democratic principles and new collective
arrangements to defend and advance them must be initiated by other democracies or by a
very broad collaboration in which the United States is active but not visibly in the lead.
We must pursue a shrewd and subtle strategy of democratic enlargement and encouragement -
"leading from behind."
The U.S. role in promoting democratic development and institution-building (within
states and among communities of states) is also threatened by what most of the world
perceives as a yawning contradiction between our rhetoric on behalf of international law
and our political behavior with regard to treaties, human rights, and the United Nations.
The U.S. Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty stunned the world and was
widely interpreted as hypocritical and damaging to arms control efforts. We are also
faulted for our failure to pay our U.N. arrears on time and to ratify major human rights
conventions, such as the International Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
provisions for an International Criminal Court. These counterproductive positions damage
the moral and political stature we need to advance democracy in the world.
We live in a world that has more democracies and awards more legitimacy to democratic
norms than ever before in history. This provides the world's most powerful democracy a
unique opportunity and responsibility: to sustain and advance international democratic
momentum. The question is whether we have the patience, the wisdom, the maturity, and the
leadership to promote the structures and initiatives that will build a democratic world
for the long run.
