In the choppy waters of the global
economy, the American ship seems
adrift. U.S. trade balances have
veered further into the chilly red latitudes
than ever before. China looms out
of the mist as a daunting industrial rival.
The winds and currents of the Internet
are opening new swathes of jobs and
service industries to competition from
India. Meanwhile, the Bush administration
has offered a dispiriting mix of
happy talk, steel tariffs, farm subsidies,
and small-bore trade agreements.
You would think Americans
would be worried. And yet, in the
last two elections, Democratic
appeals to job anxieties and fears of
low-wage competition fell flat, even
in the states thought to be most
tightly gripped by global-economy
anxiety. The Kerry-Edwards campaign's
call for labor-rights and currency
lawsuits against China
achieved little in Ohio. Bids to
extend textile quotas, by presidential
contenders and a fistful of Senate
candidates, meant even less in the
Carolinas and the deep South.
How, then, does a good progressive
manage the global economy? Attempts
to return to the past -- to the
smokestack economy of the 1970s, or
even the dot-com boom of the 1990s --
are bound to fail. But a long tradition of
progressive responses to global competition
offers good lessons, and the germ of
a program, for today.
In the 1790s, Alexander Hamilton
suggested patent laws, labor-saving
machinery, and cash rewards for innovators,
so that American factories could
beat low-wage competition through
technology and productivity.
Twentieth-century progressive presidents
from Woodrow Wilson and
Franklin Roosevelt to John Kennedy
and Bill Clinton mixed optimistic
visions of global integration with practical
domestic policy measures to keep
America in the lead and ease economic
adjustments. Wilson and Roosevelt
combined tariff reduction with activist
views of government's role in developing
worker skills and infrastructure.
Kennedy and Clinton offered a similar
mix of ideas. They opened foreign markets
through trade agreements and
championed federal support for education,
national scientific research programs,
and training programs for dislocated
workers.
A modern application of that progressive
tradition would require some
basic changes in Bush administration
policy, and also shifts of emphasis in the
prevailing progressive alternative to it.
First, level with the public. Any serious
program must begin by conceding
that America's competitors are good at
what they do. Intellectual property
piracy needs to be policed, currency
rates need to follow markets, and violations
of trade agreements need to be
stopped. But American families are
not fools who are easily tricked into
buying shoddy foreign goods. They
buy Chinese-made TV sets and clothes
because they are cheap, reliable, and
well-designed. Similarly, the technical
advice they get over the phone from
software consultants in Manila and
Bangalore is usually helpful. Those
very facts are at the root of America's
anxiety about jobs and foreign competition
-- and also the reason charges of
unfair trade often ring hollow.
A credible progressive response to
global competition must accept this. It
should insist on strong enforcement of
agreements and fair play in currency
and finance. But it should also frankly
state that our competitors are succeeding
mainly on the merits, that America
has weaknesses it needs to fix, and that
the long-term solutions lie in improving
America's competitiveness and helping
workers who need assistance.
Second, restore America's scientific
edge. Hamilton's view that a successful
American response to low-cost foreign
competition requires leadership in science
and technology remains the right
one two centuries later. We need more
research and more intense training of
scientists and engineers. Relative to the
U.S. GDP, government spending on
"hard-science" research in fields like
physics, mathematics, and chemistry
has fallen by more than 30 percent since
the 1970s. It needs to go back up.
Early science education needs to be
stronger; the Progressive Policy Institute
has suggested creating 250 new scientific
academies around the country by
2010. And with relatively few
Americans choosing technical careers --
more than one-third of America's science
and engineering Ph.D. holders are
foreign-born -- America needs to scrap
the visa restrictions that have recently
cut international enrollment in
American graduate schools.
Third, stabilize American finances.
Since 2000, the Bush administration's
budgeting has pushed national net
savings to 0.9 percent of GDP: a low-water
mark not seen since 1934.
Meanwhile, our trade and current-account
deficits have risen to 6 percent of GDP, which is an all-time record.
The deficits present a large menu of
risks, ranging from financial shock to
long-term debt buildup.
The similar but lower imbalances
of the 1980s faded as Japan and
Europe revalued their currency rates,
and the United States ditched
Reagan-era budgets. Today's analogous
response must combine greater
currency flexibility in China, growthoriented
reform in Europe and Japan,
a departure from the Bush administration's
fiscally reckless budgeting
and taxation policies, and new measures
to raise household savings rates.
Fourth, open the big markets.
America needs to export more. The
Bush administration's
approach to the matter --
a string of free-trade
agreements with 26 small
to medium-sized economies
-- won't do the
trick. All 26 of those
countries combined add
up to only 12 percent of
American trade. But
rejecting trade agreements
won't do it either.
A new approach needs
to return the European
Union, Canada, Mexico,
China, and Japan, which
together account for 70
percent of American
trade, to the center of
trade policy. To succeed in
these markets, we should
combine WTO negotiations with largescale
services agreements and tougher
enforcement in problem areas like
Chinese intellectual property rights
piracy. Complementing this approach
should be initiatives to open up big
economies like India and regions like
South America and Southeast Asia, plus
tariff reductions to promote development,
abolish regressive taxes, and support
economic reform and growth in
the Muslim world.
Fifth, help more workers. The
bargain implicit in the Trade Adjustment
Assistance program -- as we
open markets, the government provides
job training and health support to
workers who lose their jobs to import
competition -- is reasonable and productive,
but it is also a bit unfair and
badly outdated. It has never been
quite fair for a waitress who loses her
job to a computer or a change in
public tastes to receive fewer training
and health benefits than a garment
worker who loses her job to
Honduran competition -- and the
unfairness has grown as TAA benefits
have improved.
Meanwhile, the distinctions are blurring
as the Internet spreads global
competition into services. Each day,
trade becomes harder to pick out
from other causes of job loss. The
new environment requires a new
adjustment system -- a universal one
opening TAA-style benefits to all dislocated
workers, including job training,
health insurance support, and
perhaps eventually wage insurance.
Finally, learn from the public. In
America's global-economy debate, the
public seems far ahead of both parties.
The administration's insouciance
lacks credibility. So does the left's
now-reflexive dislike of trade and its
nostalgia for the American economy
of the past.
Public opinion surveys reveal a
sophisticated, realistic public that
wants trade, but also recognizes the
need for policy responses to competitive
challenges. A March 2006
Pew Center poll finds 66 percent of
Americans viewing "free trade with
foreign countries" as a good thing
for the United States, just about the
same figure as the 64 percent of
2000. Equally credible polls find
Americans deeply worried that their
jobs are vulnerable to foreign competition
and that the country's competitive
lead is shrinking.
In effect, a sophisticated and realistic
public is looking for realism, balance,
and adult supervision. That is
what the progressive
heritage offers.
Half a century ago,
after the Sputnik launch
and the creation of the
European Community,
the Kennedy administration
responded with
federal education support,
the space program,
and the Trade Adjustment
Assistance program.
In the 1980s, as
trade deficits rose and
Japanese competition
moved beyond steel and
cars to semiconductor
chips and satellites, the
early New Democrat
movement called for
restored control of the budget,
open markets abroad and at home,
and investments in science and human
capital, which helped create a decade of
unprecedented job creation and growth.
Today's challenges from China's
low-cost factories and India's burgeoning
software labs are not the
same as those of European integration
and Soviet science in the 1950s
and 1960s or Japanese manufacturing
in the 1980s. But the principles
of a successful response are much the
same. Progressives looking for the
key to a successful future need only
to learn from their past.