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PPI | Backgrounder | June 1, 1991
Equality and the American Creed Understanding the Affirmative Action Debate By Seymour Martin Lipset
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Affirmative action policies, perceived as special
preferences for blacks, other defined minorities such
as Native Americans, Hispanics and certain groups of
Asians, and women, have introduced a new approach to
promoting equality in American life. The old approach,
initially voiced in the Declaration of Independence,
emphasized equality for individuals, defined as
equality of opportunity. The new approach focuses on
equality for groups, defined as equality of result. It
is the collision of these two views on equality that
underlies the growing public controversy over
affirmative action and quotas.
In order to understand how these perspectives fit
into the American debate, this essay examines their
origins in the diverse experiences of whites and
blacks. The central argument here is that affirmative
action policies have forced a sharp confrontation
between two core American values: egalitarianism and
individualism. It is the egalitarian element in the
American Creed that created the consensus behind the
civil rights revolution of the past 30 years. But the
more recent focus of the civil rights movement, with
its emphasis on substantive equality and preferential
treatment, forced the country up against the
individualistic, achievement-oriented element in the
Creed. As a result, the consensus has been broken.
Most Americans make a critical distinction between
compensatory action and preferential treatment.
Compensatory action involves measures to help
disadvantaged groups catch up to the standards of
competition set by the larger society -- examples
include Head Start and other education programs,
federal college aid, job training, community
development. Preferential treatment involves
suspending those standards -- adopting quotas or other
devices that favor citizens on the basis of their
membership in groups rather than on the basis of merit.
While most Americans support the former, public opinion
polls show that majorities of blacks and whites
consistently oppose the latter.
The essay concludes with suggestions for
refocusing affirmative action on its original goal of
guaranteeing equal treatment to individuals. New
strategies for enabling members of minority groups to
move into the social and economic mainstream should be
universalistic or linked to variable traits, such as
poverty, rather than to race, gender or ethnicity.
Examples include a nationwide system of job
apprenticeship for all non-college-bound youths and a
civilian version of the G.I. Bill that encourages young
people to earn money for college or training by
volunteering for service in their communities. The
ultimate goal remains, as Lyndon Johnson stressed a
generation ago, greater equality of opportunity within
a free market economy.
From its inception, the United States has been
composed of two peoples whose values and outlook stem
from radically different experiences. The dominant or
majority view, as explicated in the American Creed and
described in the writings of many foreign sociological
observers of the country, has been characterized by an
emphasis on social egalitarianism, respect across class
lines, equality of opportunity, and meritocracy. The
minority view, identified with the situation of black
Americans, has clearly been for most of American
history a system of explicit hierarchy, of caste, of
inequality related to hereditary origins.1
The American Creed can be subsumed in five terms:
liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism (the
rule of the people) and laissez-faire. As Alexis de
Tocqueville noted, egalitarianism, in its American
meaning, has emphasized equality of opportunity and of
respect, not of result or condition.2 These values
reflect the absence of feudal structures and monarchies
and aristocracies. As a new society, the country
lacked the emphasis on social hierarchy and deference
characteristic of post-feudal cultures. These aspects,
as Tocqueville and Max Weber stressed, were reinforced
by the country's religious commitment to the
"nonconformist", largely congregationally organized,
Protestant sects which emphasize voluntarism with
respect to the state, and a personal or individual
relationship to God, one not mediated by hierarchically
organized churches, which predominated in Europe,
Canada and Latin America.3 In much of Europe, on the
other hand, the historic national values are derivative
from strong monarchical and mercantilist states, feudal
class and hierarchial religious structures and
traditions, which favored an emphasis on hereditary
status and family origins.
The importance of these values is also linked, as
Friedrich Engels, Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci
stressed, to the fact that the United States is the
purest bourgeois nation, the least affected by feudal
heritages.4 The key values endemic in capitalism and
industrialism are universalism and achievement.
Success in market economies is facilitated by rejection
of particularistic obligations, that is of nepotism and
other sources of close personal ties. The norms of the
market call for meritocracy. An efficient market is
open both domestically and abroad. Hiring the best
qualified person, whether he or she is black or white,
Jewish or Gentile, native or foreign born, is the best
way to maximize economic return. The logic of the
market dictates selling to those who will pay the most
and buying from the lowest priced seller.
A stress on achievement, on moving up in the class
system, linked with the widespread belief in
individualism and equality of opportunity, has been
greater in America than in Europe. On the public
policy level, this can be seen most clearly in the
early emphasis on the extension of public education to
all, as well as the decision to try to give everyone a
common education.5
It cannot be stressed enough that much in
contemporary attitudes and behavior may be explained by
the emphasis in the culture on achievement, on getting
ahead. As Robert K. Merton has noted, Americans have
always believed that everyone (only whites until
recently) should try to be a success, regardless of
background.6 Opinion poll data indicate that this
value remains powerful, and that most white people now
believe it applies to blacks as well. While
understandably ambivalent about the promise of America,
a majority of blacks also is committed to the belief
that hard work and educational attainment will enable
them to get ahead. A Spring 1991 Gallup poll found
that both races, "69 percent of whites and 68 percent
of blacks say that African-Americans should focus most
of their energy on improving [their] education."7
The strength of the achievement norm is related to
another one -- universalism. Counterpoised to
particularism or special treatment, universalism refers
to the belief that everyone should be treated similarly
in the marketplace of life without reference to traits
stemming from birth, class, religion, ethnicity, gender
and color.
The treatment of blacks has been the foremost
deviation from the American Creed throughout the
history of the Republic. If we count American history
as starting around 1600, blacks have been here almost
from the beginning. However, unlike whites, they spent
their first two and a half centuries, that is, until
1865, as slaves. For the next 100 years they largely
served as a lower caste group working under explicit or
implicit Jim Crow policies, with little opportunity to
gain educational or financial resources. Caste
systems, whether slavery or segregation, were much more
explicitly hierarchial and hereditary than European
feudalism. Blacks have only been given a claim to
political equality and economic opportunity since the
1960s.
Thomas Jefferson and George Washington voiced
their concern over the way the treatment of blacks
would affect the future of America. Jefferson wrote in
1781 that, "I tremble for my country when I reflect
that God is just."8 Anticipating in 1791 the
possibility that the country might break up because it
could not resolve the problem, George Washington told a
friend that if this happened "he had made up his mind
to move and be of the northern."9 Jefferson, who
wrote the Declaration, felt -- correctly as it turned
out -- that its proclamation that "all men are created
equal" would undermine slavery, and that the idea of
equality would have a continuing effect on American
politics.
Following the logic of Jefferson's observation,
Gunnar Myrdal noted in An American Dilemma (1944), his
classic analysis of American racism, that white
Americans, including most southerners, believe in the
Creed, even though their racist practices violate it.
From this assumption he concluded that if blacks would
organize to vigorously defend their rights and assert
that they are mistreated, whites would have to give in.
Once they were forced to recognize that blacks were not
treated equally, they would have to change their
behavior if they wanted to maintain their belief in the
Creed.10 The political successes of the civil rights
movement in the sixties showed Myrdal was right.
However, in yielding politically, many among the white
male political elite also have agreed to group rights,
to a form of equality of results.
The value system of white Americans has stressed
the individual.11 Citizens have been expected to
demand and protect their rights on a personal basis.
The exceptional emphasis on law in the United States as
compared with Europe, derived from the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights, has stressed individual rights
against the state and other powers. The experience of
black Americans, however, has focused on group
characteristics, on defining and treating people not
according to their personal merits, but according to
their ancestry, their race, and their ethnic group.
Post-feudal Europe, too, was organized in
particularistic terms, that is, according to class
background. European workers and American blacks thus
share a stress on class and group solidarity and
collective remedies. However, Europe was less
stringently stratified than the post-slavery system in
the United States. Thus pre-World War II America
differed from Europe in two ways: 1) for its large
white majority it was much more egalitarian,
individualistic and populist; 2) for its black
minority it was much more hierarchial and
particularistic, group defined, and less free.
1. Curiously, many of the classic writings about the
United States in the 19th century, which stressed its
exceptional character as an egalitarian society, even
those written by people who were strongly abolitionist
in their sentiments, either ignored the position of
blacks, or cited it as a major exception to the pattern
which would in time inevitably change and be
incorporated into the larger system.
2. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 51.
3. Ibid, p. 312.
4. For previous discussion and references see S. M.
Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions
of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge,
1990), p. 25.
5. It is interesting to read the works of Horace Mann and
others writing in the 1830s and 1840s in support of the
common school. By this term, they meant what today is
called the integrated school. They insisted that the
public schools should be common to all, rich and poor,
children of immigrants and of natives. This goal, of
course did not include blacks, most of whom were slaves
at the time.
The strength of this early American commitment to
meritocracy and competitive achievement may be seen in
the many writings which consciously rejected the
European class differentiated education system. To
foster equality of opportunity, the educational
reformers held up for scorn European academic high
schools, the gymnasia in Germany, the lycees in France,
the grammar or public schools in England, which only
served the top ten percent of the population at best.
As they noted, in Europe, other youth were not supposed
to obtain skills which would permit them to move up.
They could not go to high school. As urban industrial
jobs developed, the children of the underprivileged
were allowed to attend vocational schools. American
educators and politicians rejected this model as
fostering a class society. Rather, as noted, they
pressed for education in a common school. These trans-
Atlantic variations continued deep into the twentieth
century, as many European countries maintained
academically high standard schools attended by a small
privileged minority, destined for university.
The vitality of the early stress on meritocratic
values is attested by one of the most remarkable and
curious developments in American history, the emergence
in the late 1820s of the first political groups in the
world to be known as Workingmen's parties. In New
York, Philadelphia, Boston, and other cities, these
parties received between ten and fifteen percent of the
vote in local and state elections. They later merged
with Democrats during the subsequent Jacksonian period.
Some of the Workingmen's parties, particularly the one
in New York City, advocated the most radical policy any
political party has ever put forth: the
nationalization of children, sending them away to
boarding school from age six on. The Workingmen were
not socialists, they believed in private property; they
wanted people to strive to get ahead to become rich,
precisely because they favored a more open, more
competitive society. Common schools in their view were
not sufficient to foster egalitarianism. Attending the
same school for five or six hours a day would not
change the basic environment of children of diverse
social origins. They contended that the only way to
eliminate the advantage which family and neighborhood
environment give the affluent is to require that all
students spend 24 hours a day in the same place, in a
state-financed boarding school.
In effect, the Workingmen clearly linked class-
based cultural advantage to the perpetuation of
inequality. Their solution, as noted, was to take all
white children away from their parents, one clearly
linked to a comparable proposal made by Plato millennia
ago. That "solution," I submit, is the most drastic
proposal ever made by a political organization. It is
much more extreme than nationalizing all the property
in the country.
Not surprisingly, the Workingmen did not gain
power. They were, however, able to elect members to
legislatures and city councils. The fact that a party
with this radical plank could get ten to fifteen
percent of the vote in New York City, indicates that
during the first half century of the republic, at the
time of slavery, there was a strong commitment to the
value of equality of opportunity for whites, which was
linked to a belief in a competitive market economy.
Edward Pessen, Most Uncommon Jacksonians (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1967), pp. 183-189;
and Walter Hugins, Jacksonian Democracy and the Working
Class, A Study of the New York Workingmen's Movement
1829-1837 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1960), pp. 13, 18-20, 132-134.
6. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure
(Glencoe, Il.: The Free Press, 1957), p. 169.
7. Mark Whitaker et al, "A Crisis of Shattered Dreams,"
Newsweek, May 6, 1991, p. 31.
8. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (New
York: Harper and Row Torchbooks, 1964), p. 156.
9. James Thomas Flexner, Washington: The Indispensable
Man (New York: New American Library, 1984), pp. 389-
390.
10. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper
and Row, 1962), pp. 462-466.
11. Generalizations such as these are inherently
comparative, in this case with other countries, and are
obviously not meant as absolute judgements. Obviously,
Americans have distinguished and discriminated by group
characteristics, as is evident in nativist anti-
immigrant policies, quota restrictions against Jews and
the like. But as compared to all other nations, they
have been more individualistic.
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