

From Selective Service to National Service

A Blueprint for Citizenship and Security in the 21st Century

by Marc Magee

When Congress created the All Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, it kept one vestige of the old World War II-era draft: the requirement that all American males register with the Selective Service System on their 18th birthday. This seemed a prudent hedge during the Cold War, when America faced adversaries (the Soviet Union and China) with massive armies. Since the Evil Empire collapsed, however, the chance of fighting another 20th century-style war of attrition has receded, and the AVF has demonstrated its overwhelming strength over America's new adversaries on the battlefield. It is reasonable to ask whether draft registration serves any useful purpose today, or whether it, too, should be consigned to history.

Although it seems unlikely the United States will go back to the draft anytime soon, it is also true that America's military personnel have been stretched thin by a decade of increasing military engagement in the world and more recently by wars with, and post-war commitments in, Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, critical security needs both at home and abroad continue to go unmet for lack of an effective way to bring more Americans into civilian programs targeted at homeland security and reducing the conditions that breed terror overseas.

Instead of discarding the Selective Service System as an anachronism, therefore, this report proposes that it be reinvented as a recruiting device for voluntary national service. Specifically, PPI proposes to:

- ▶ Replace the current Selective Service System with a National Service System that recruits young Americans to serve in one of three programs targeted at our new security needs:

the military's new, short-term "citizen soldier" enlistment program, which should be scaled up to ease the growing strains on our military personnel; AmeriCorps, the nation's leading civilian volunteer corps, which should be expanded to bolster homeland security; and the Peace Corps, which should once again be a vital component of U.S. efforts to promote political and economic freedom abroad.

- ▶ Require that both men and women register in this new National Service System.
- ▶ Continue draft registration for those who choose not to volunteer for any of the three service options.

This policy report traces the evolution of America's approach to raising the military forces for its defense, examines growing strains on our current model of military recruiting and the emerging demands for civilian security efforts, and presents a blueprint for converting the passive Selective Service System into a National Service System that actively recruits young volunteers to serve their country.

The Evolution of the Current System

There have been three phases in American history for raising the forces needed to ensure our safety and security: 1) the citizen militias and expeditionary volunteers of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, 2) the mass mobilization and military drafts of the two World Wars, and 3) the all-volunteer force of the post-Vietnam era.

1607-1861: Citizen Militias and Expeditionary Volunteers

The earliest American settlers sought to meet threats to their security through citizen militias. As these settlements grew into colonies, civilian-led forces oriented toward temporary action served as the heart of the American system of self-defense.¹ Under this system all freemen between the ages of 17 and 60 were required to arm themselves, train together a few times a year, and in cases of emergency serve for short periods of time in defense of their community or in retaliatory strikes.² When expeditionary forces were needed for terms of service of one year or longer, legislatures provided funds to raise small armies composed of paid volunteers.

While in large-scale conflicts such as the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War of 1846, this approach was strained by the large numbers of personnel needed to ensure victory, it was not until the Civil War that this model was stretched beyond the breaking point.³ With major battles often ending in 20,000 to 40,000 casualties, by the second year of the war President Lincoln was forced to initiate America's first draft. Although only 8 percent of the 2.1 million who served in the Union Army during the Civil War were draftees, this turn to a draft in the darkest year of America's bloodiest war paved the way for reinventing how Americans raised military forces in the era of warfare that awaited the nation in the next century.⁴

1917-1973: Mass Mobilization and the Draft

While Woodrow Wilson initially resisted compulsory service (supporting instead an increase in the size of the regular Army, the creation of a new reserve force, and a new program that provided every American with the opportunity to participate in six weeks of military training), as the scope and scale of WWI became more clear, he reversed course and came out in favor of a selective wartime draft. He argued that only a draft would allow the nation to raise the number of troops needed to win the war in a way that would be fair to all Americans.⁵

To assure that this new draft was not only efficient and fair but also preserved the community-based characteristics of the citizen militia, Wilson created the Selective Service System. Based on the concept of "supervised decentralization," this new organization combined central coordination from Washington with local administration of the conscription process.⁶ All American men between the ages of 21 and 30 were required to register at their local voting precinct, while the actual selection process was carried out at the county level by governor-appointed civilian boards. This approach was designed to ensure a draft process that both "followed the democratic doctrine of self-government" and provided the millions of troops needed for the war in a way that was fair and orderly.⁷ To encourage registration, local councils tried whenever possible to use the power of moral coercion, such as posting the names of young men who had not registered, before resorting to harsher penalties such as one-year prison terms.

In all, 2.5 million of the 3.5 million Americans who served in WWI were conscripted through this process. Not only did it prove successful in meeting the demand for soldiers during the 18 months that America was at war, it did so in a way that enjoyed broad support from the American people and was applied fairly across the social stratum.⁸ In WWII this system was once again put to use, this time on an even larger scale, inducting 10 million of the 16 million Americans who served in uniform during the war.⁹

While the use of the draft during the post-WWII period and in the Korean War stretched the system beyond its original function of providing mass numbers of troops in conflicts central to the survival of the nation, it was not until the Vietnam War that public support for conscription broke down. During this war the use of the draft in a conflict that did not require a large-scale mobilization was compounded by its unfair implementation. Exemptions for students working toward college, graduate, and professional degrees introduced during the post-Korean War period resulted in high school dropouts being twice as likely to serve as college graduates were. At the height of the opposition to the war, from 1970 to 1972, for every three

men drafted, two applied for conscientious objector status.¹⁰ In 1973, President Nixon ended the draft, and soon after, America's involvement in the Vietnam War was brought to a close.

1973-2003: All-Volunteer Force

Balancing the need for a large military force with a public traumatized by the difficult experience of Vietnam, in 1973 Richard Nixon ushered in the third American model of self-defense: the all-volunteer force.¹¹ This new approach was grounded in a layered system of defense composed of three tiers: 1) an active-duty force, 2) a community-based reserve force, and 3) a draft registration program.

The first tier of this system, the active duty force, was designed to bring in large numbers of Americans through market-based wages to serve in long-term career-track enlistments as the frontline of America's defense. This approach was a reversal of the system used in the middle period of the 20th century, where a mix of short-term citizen soldier draftees and longer-term professional soldiers made up the active duty force, but was also a return to the approach of the pre-WWI era, where military expeditionary units were composed of long-term volunteers recruited through cash incentives (albeit this time on a much larger scale).¹²

The second tier in this system, the reserve force, was designed to make up for some of the anticipated shortcomings of an active duty force recruited exclusively into long-term career-track enlistments. The use of the Reserves in this system was grounded in the Total Force concept, which called for shifting critical skills needed during wartime into the Reserves and tightly integrating these part-time soldiers into the overall force. This approach offered two main benefits: It eased the strains created by an expensive active duty force by shifting important functions into the less expensive part-time force; and grounded future fighting capabilities in community-based units, thus helping maintain a connection between the military and the larger society in a way that a career-based active duty force could not.¹³

The third tier in this system, the Selective Service System's draft registration program, was designed for mass mobilization in the event of a


major conflict. Under this program, all American men are required to register with the Selective Service System within 30 days of their 18th birthday and notify the System of any changes in address during their period of eligibility—from ages 18 to 26. This program was designed to provide a way to bring a much larger pool of young Americans into service in a time of crisis and also help ensure that, like the citizen militias and military drafts of the past, a connection between the rights and responsibilities of citizenship is preserved.¹⁴

Over the last thirty years this third American model for raising the forces needed to ensure our safety and security—combined with investments in revolutionary military technology, innovative battlefield tactics, and a strong emphasis on training—has played a critical role in ensuring our military strength.¹⁵ However, there are also some key shortcomings that require our attention.

Strains in the Current Approach to Military Service

Our impressive military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that in many ways the three-decade old system for involving Americans in military service continues to fulfill its essential mission. However, there are three ways the current approach has led to strains in providing the military personnel needed to meet the new security challenges we face.

First, by grounding military recruitment exclusively in market-based incentives and limiting the obligation of Americans to simply registering for the draft, the current approach has led to a less-representative force. For example, while the percentage of Americans ages 18 to 24 with some college experience has roughly doubled since 1964 (from 25 percent to 46 percent), the percentage of enlistees ages 18 to 24 in the active duty force with some college experience is half of what it was in 1964 (declining from 14 percent to 7 percent).¹⁶ As a result of this failure to encourage more college-bound youth to serve, military recruiters are left scrambling to fill their quotas every year from the ever-shrinking slice of the population whose education ends with a high school diploma. This in turn has led to ever-higher expenditures for




advertising and enlistment bonuses, increasing (in constant 2000 dollars) from \$95 million in 1993 to \$560 million by 2000 (see Chart 1).¹⁷

Second, by basing recruiting for the active duty force exclusively on long-term career-track enlistments, the current system has also fueled a steady increase in personnel costs. The higher upfront cost of advertising and enlistment bonuses is thus compounded by steadily increasing per capita manpower costs for the active-duty force, rising (in constant 1999 dollars) from \$29,140 per year in 1964 to \$43,209 per year in 1986, and \$63,812 per year by 1999.¹⁸ Over time, these higher personnel costs have squeezed out funding for the R&D and procurement critical to our high-tech Armed Forces, and created pressure to move toward an ever-smaller

active duty force with even greater numbers of critical personnel shifted into the lower-cost reserve force (see Chart 2).

Third, by shifting more and more critical skills from the high-cost active duty force to the reserve force, the Total Force approach of the current system has become increasingly strained by more frequent deployments in the last decade. During the Cold War this Total Force model and multi-tiered structure was well-suited for its primary role of deterrence, and limited the service of most reservists to training one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer for the possibility of WWIII. As a result, in 1986 the Reserve component performed only 0.9 million duty days. However, as the Cold War came to a close and deterrence gave way to a




more active military engagement in the world, this number has risen steadily, increasing to 13.5 million duty days by 2001 (see Chart 3).¹⁹ The mobilization of National Guard and Reserve troops since Sept. 11, the longest since Vietnam, has further stretched this Total Force system, placing tremendous strains on reservists and their families.²⁰

One sign of the heavy toll these mobilizations are taking on the troops is the fact that the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have fallen 6,000 recruits short of their 62,000-person annual recruitment target. As Tom White, former secretary of the Army, stated, "I think it is reasonable to conclude that people are looking

a way that holds down the growth of recruiting and personnel costs.

Accomplishing these goals will require a sustained effort to reconnect national service and national defense. One important step forward in this effort was taken last year when the 18-month citizen soldier enlistment program was signed into law as a result of the hard work of Sens. Evan Bayh and John McCain.²³ It is now time to take the next step in this effort by scaling up this citizen soldier track and connecting it to a reinvented Selective Service System focused on bringing a much wider cross-section of Americans into military service and easing the growing strains on our military personnel.²⁴



at the last 19 to 20 months of mobilization and they are voting with their feet."²¹ The long-term military commitment in postwar Iraq ensures that the strains on the Reserves will only get worse as many of the critical skills needed for this effort, including support, logistics, transportation, security, and civil affairs, are found primarily or exclusively in these Reserves units.²²

While the all-volunteer force has proven to be an effective military system over the last 30 years, it is still a work in progress. What is needed now is a better way to tap the growing pool of college-bound youth, shift critical skills from the part-time reserve force to the full-time active duty force to help support the greater operational tempo of this new era, and do so in

The Need for Civilian Service

While our system for encouraging military service has led to significant strains that will need to be addressed, there are also critical challenges that currently fall outside its scope. Seeking to terrorize our population rather than confront our troops on the battlefield, the tactics of America's new enemies necessitate a more robust security effort here at home. Likewise, in the battle against terrorism, our success will be determined not just by how well we destroy the terrorist groups that threaten us today, but by how well we change the conditions overseas to ensure that new terrorist networks will not emerge to threaten us in the future. With U.S. Armed Forces

already stretched thin by our military commitments around the globe, many of these critical security needs continue to go unmet for lack of a way to bring more Americans into non-military programs. What is needed therefore is a broadening of our service system to include full-time civilian service programs targeted at our key security needs.

AmeriCorps

Since the attacks of Sept. 11, our homeland security mobilization efforts have been primarily directed at information campaigns for citizens, such as the government’s ready.gov website and ad campaign, or focused exclusively on the military, such as the large-scale mobilization of the National Guard. What has been left out of this approach is an organized, community-based system that can bring more people into one or two years of full-time civilian service tackling our key homeland security challenges in a cost-effective way.


Recently, AmeriCorps, the full-time national service program, has taken important steps forward to create just such a system. In July 2002, the Corporation for National and Community Service awarded \$4.3 million in grants to 16 AmeriCorps programs in 10 states to run homeland security projects in the upcoming year. These 16 programs involve 356 AmeriCorps members, who in turn are helping

train and organize 7,024 community volunteers, in projects focused on emergency preparedness education, Citizen Emergency Response Teams (CERT), police and fire department support efforts, and disaster emergency planning.²⁵ However, after a decade of growth, the number of AmeriCorps members is set to decline in the upcoming year as a result of deep cuts pushed through by the Republican leadership in Congress (Chart 4), putting these vital homeland security projects at risk.²⁶

Providing the manpower needed to take these important homeland security efforts nationwide will require not only getting the growth of AmeriCorps back on track and connecting this expansion to the new role of homeland security, but also including service in these civilian security projects as an option in a reinvented Selective Service System.

The Peace Corps

Just as in the case of these homeland security efforts, since Sept. 11 our efforts to change the conditions that support terrorism abroad have been primarily focused either on traditional military operations or changes in governmental policy, such as recent efforts to encourage economic and political reform through the expansion of free trade zones and the targeting of international aid.²⁷ What has been missing from this approach is a way to involve more




Americans themselves in international projects targeted at helping to bring developing countries that are potential terrorist threats into the modern world of human rights, robust civil society, and representative government.²⁸

And as in the case of homeland security, developing such a system does not require starting from scratch. The Peace Corps—created in 1961 by John F. Kennedy to help win the hearts

From Selective Service to National Service

Meeting the new security challenges of this new century will require that we rethink and reinvent the biggest anachronism in our current approach, the Selective Service System, so that it can better contribute to our new security needs. With the primacy of the deterrence role of the



and minds of Third World countries in the battle against an expansionist communist enemy—has over the last four decades developed a robust international service infrastructure, placing more than 168,000 Americans in 136 countries worldwide.²⁹ However, having peaked at 16,000 members a year in 1966, the number of people serving in the Peace Corps has held steady at about 6,500 members a year for the last three-and-a-half decades (see Chart 5). What is needed now is an effort to connect this service program to the new challenges of this new century by expanding its focus beyond sustainable development to include civic projects most likely to reduce the conditions that fuel terrorism. Ensuring that the Peace Corps has the manpower needed to make an impact in this long struggle against terrorism will require not only a commitment to expand the opportunity to serve, but also an effort to connect more Americans with these new opportunities by including service in these international projects as another of the options in a reinvented Selective Service System.

Armed Forces having given way to ever-higher levels of operational tempo to support a more active engagement in the world, the use of the Selective Service System for registration alone no longer makes sense. Similarly, the expanding need for civilian security efforts suggests that a broader system of service is warranted. At the same time, the manpower needs of our current security efforts, while large and growing, fall short of the scale required to justify a reinstatement of the draft. What is needed, therefore, is a Third Way between conscription and the status quo, one that helps restore a civic dimension to our recruiting efforts while working within the voluntary structure of the current system.

Since the Selective Service System right now asks young Americans only to register for a future draft, we should not be surprised when that is all most young Americans do.³⁰ What is needed in these challenging times is a more active approach that—like the patriotic campaigns of old—challenges young people to actually serve.³¹ While the draft registration requirement should

be preserved as a hedge against future threats, the main function of this new system should be recruiting for the security needs of the present by bringing a greater cross-section of Americans into military service, easing the strains on the Reserves, holding down recruiting costs, and providing personnel for the new challenges of homeland security and international efforts to change the conditions that breed terror. While success cannot be accomplished overnight, a sustained effort grounded in the following three fundamental reforms would move us much closer to these goals.³²

Shift From Registration to Recruitment and Broaden Service Options

The critical function of any service system is providing the personnel needed to ensure success. The failure of the Selective Service System to serve this essential task is at the core of many of the current challenges in advancing our security. With growing demands on our military personnel and the increasing need for civilian security efforts both at home and abroad, we can no longer afford a system that limits its efforts to registration alone.

The following changes will help transform the passive approach of the current Selective Service System into a more robust and active National Service System charged with helping recruit young Americans into service programs targeted at our most pressing security needs.

- ▶ **Use the registration process to recruit.** Reorganize the current Selective Service System into a National Service System where the process of registration is used to encourage young Americans to serve their country. Provide two options during the registration process: 1) the current “name on the list” registration, and 2) a commitment to serve, which would exempt the individual from any future draft.³³
- ▶ **Include a menu of both military and civilian service options.** The registration process should present young Americans with at least three service options: military service, civilian homeland security service, and service in international civic programs focused on reducing the conditions that support terrorism.
- ▶ **Connect service to expanded educational awards.** In the spirit of the GI Bill, each form of service should be connected to an education grant that increases the affordability of college. In line with the new \$18,000 education grant for 18 months of military service, one year of full-time service in AmeriCorps should be rewarded with a \$7,000 education grant, and two years of full-time service in the Peace Corps should be rewarded with a \$9,000 education grant.³⁴
- ▶ **Connect service to expanded educational opportunities.** Public and private colleges should be encouraged to favor applicants who agree to perform national service over applicants who choose the registration-only option.³⁵ To help facilitate this process, these educational institutions should be provided access to a secure database containing Americans’ records of service. To ensure that the commitment to serve is made in time for consideration during the college applications process, the registration requirement should be moved forward six months from age 18 to 17-and-a-half.
- ▶ **Honor and recognize those who serve.** Small grants should be provided to recognize those young Americans who answer the call to service by listing their names on plaques in their high schools and public libraries. Small grants should also be provided for communities to hold annual service ceremonies on election eve (the first Monday in November) to honor these individuals and symbolically connect the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

Expand Short-Term Military, Homeland Security, and International Service Programs

While transforming the Selective Service System into a National Service System will help ensure that we have the recruits needed to take

on these new security challenges, our ultimate success will be determined by whether we are able to match young Americans who want to serve with the opportunity to do so. This in turn will require a commitment to create a new generation of service programs of sufficient scale to match the influx of new recruits.

- ▶ **Expand the short-term citizen soldier enlistment program.** This new program, which is founded on an 18-month enlistment, should be scaled up to 25,000 recruits in 2004, and, if military needs warrant, 90,000 by 2010. The growth of this program should be used to shift critical skills from the part-time reserve force to the full-time active duty force, easing the strains created by the higher operational tempo of this new era. It should also be used as part of an overall effort to increase the education and aptitude scores of incoming enlistees.
- ▶ **Expand AmeriCorps homeland security efforts.** Drawing on this successful decentralized approach to promoting civilian service in America's communities, the number of AmeriCorps members serving per year should be increased from 50,000 to 75,000 in 2004, with a target of at least 250,000 by 2010. Half of all new AmeriCorps slots should be dedicated to homeland security projects.
- ▶ **Expand Peace Corps efforts to change the conditions that fuel terrorism.** The Peace Corps program should be reconnected to America's key foreign policy goals by dedicating half of all new Peace Corps members to projects focused on changing the conditions that breed terror. The number of Americans serving in the Peace Corps should be scaled up from 7,000 to 15,000 members in 2004, with a target of at least 50,000 members by 2010.

Include Both Men and Women in this National Service System

Our success in the long struggle ahead will

be determined by the degree to which we make use of all the resources we have available. With women making up a significant and growing percentage of our Armed Forces, and the majority of personnel in America's civilian service programs, their inclusion in this new National Service System will be critical to its success.³⁶

Currently, the Selective Service System does not require or permit the participation of women. As we shift to a National Service System with both military and civilian security service options, this exclusion of women is no longer practical or philosophically justifiable.³⁷ In addition, with the rights of citizenship connected so directly to the responsibilities of collective security, the inclusion of women in this system is an essential step toward ensuring that this American social compact continues to have relevance in our changing times.

- ▶ **Expand registration requirements to include women in the new National Service System.**
- ▶ **Maintain the current restrictions on women in combat.** The immediate needs of our country demand a timely response. Given the limited nature of the current gender restrictions (covering about 10 percent of all military occupations and about 20 percent of all military positions) it is not necessary to lift them to ensure the successful inclusion of women in this overall system.³⁸

Conclusion

In his State of the Union Address four months after the attacks of Sept. 11, President Bush captured the feelings of many Americans when he stated, "In the sacrifice of soldiers, the fierce brotherhood of firefighters, and the bravery and generosity of ordinary citizens, we have glimpsed what a new culture of responsibility could look like. We want to be a nation that serves goals larger than self. We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass."³⁹ Yet in the 17 months since those remarks, little real progress has been made to

involve more Americans in the great challenges of our time. If we are to preserve our hard fought freedoms in this new century, patriotism must be more than an applause line, it must be a way of life.

Doing so will require that we reinvent, renew, and refocus the institutions that in times past have served the essential function of translating Americans' civic energy into civic action. A small investment now in transforming the Selective Service System into a new, more

comprehensive, recruitment-oriented National Service System could help bring a whole new "Greatest Generation" into service tackling causes greater than self. By connecting this new National Service System to expanded military and civilian service programs, we will not only ensure that we have the manpower needed to meet the new security challenges of this new century, but we will do so in a way that helps restore service to our country as a civic rite of passage for America's youth.

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Appendix I: National Service System “Call to Service” Card

A Call To Service

Your country needs you! Every year hundreds of thousands of young Americans just like you take up the duty and the honor of national service. There are many ways you can help make your country and your community safe and secure, each with its own challenges and rewards.

Volunteer and Choose! By committing to serve your country now you will have the opportunity to choose how you would like to make a difference. You will also earn money for college and may receive favorable status in your college applications. Those Americans who choose not to serve will remain eligible for any future military draft.

Please check the box next to the option of your choice and return this form signed and dated within one month.

- U.S. Armed Forces:** Active duty enlistments starting at 18 months, with an \$18,000 education scholarship.
- AmeriCorps:** 12 months of domestic civilian service, with a \$7,000 education scholarship.
- Peace Corps:** 24 months of international civilian service, with a \$9,000 education scholarship.

OR

- Register me for the draft.**

Signature _____ Date _____

Appendix II: Public Support for National Service

- ▶ **National service programs are popular.**⁴⁰ A 1995 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll found that 79 percent of Americans supported AmeriCorps. A 1997 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll found that 77 percent supported “the Peace Corps, AmeriCorps and Learn and Serve America program.” A 2002 Penn/Schoen/Berland poll found that 81 percent supported “efforts by the federal government to encourage increased community and national service among Americans.”
- ▶ **The public strongly supports their expansion.** The 2002 Penn/Schoen/Berland poll also found that 70 percent supported “dramatically enlarging America’s national service program” and that 78 percent supported “the creation of a large-scale voluntary civil defense corps to assist in homeland security.”
- ▶ **A national service system based on a “call to service” enjoys broad support.** The 1999 Penn/Schoen/Berland poll found that 74 percent of the public supported “a universal system of national citizen service where young adults would be called upon to serve their country either through military or community service.” A 2002 PSRA/Pew Forum poll found that 81 percent of 18-29 year olds support this type of national service system.
- ▶ **The issue of mandatory service divides the American public.** A 1987 Gallup poll found that only 55 percent favored mandatory national service for men and only 44 percent favored mandatory service for women. Similarly, the 1999 poll by Penn/Schoen/Berland found that if men were required to serve, public support for a national service system dropped from 74 to 56 percent. If women were required to serve, support dropped to 46 percent. The 2002 PSRA/Pew Forum poll found that among those most likely to have to serve (18-29 year olds), support is even lower, with 43 percent in favor and 56 percent opposed if men are required to serve, and 36 percent in favor and 63 percent opposed if women are also required to serve.

Appendix III: The Costs of a National Service System

- ▶ **National Service System Agency.** Currently, the Selective Service System is staffed by 165 full-time personnel, who are assisted by 11 part-time Reserves officers, 450 part-time state directors, and 10,620 Civilian Review Board volunteers. The agency's budget for FY 2002 was \$25 million.⁴¹ The transition to a National Service System would require an initial redesign of the registration forms and website; additional full-time staff to process the increased registrations created by extending the program to women; additional full-time personnel to serve as liaisons with the military and civilian service programs in which the recruits would be placed; and additional funds to support the grants for community-based service ceremonies. These changes would require approximately **\$25 million** in additional funds per year to support the expanded responsibilities of the new agency.⁴²
- ▶ **Citizen Soldier Program.** If the Citizen Soldier program were implemented within the existing endstrength of the active duty force, it would likely not require any additional funding beyond existing personnel funds (which stood at \$78 billion in FY 2002). About 90,000 recruits per year could potentially be brought into the Armed Forces through this short-term enlistment track within the existing force structure.⁴³ If, however, the expansion of the Citizen Soldier program was used to increase the size of the active duty force, the additional personnel costs would be significant (approximately \$25,000 in initial entry training per recruit and about \$35,000 in pay and benefits per recruit during the 18-month enlistment), but potentially far less than the cost incurred through the use of the current longer-term enlistments.
- ▶ **AmeriCorps Program.** Currently, the Corporation for National and Community Service, which administers AmeriCorps, the Senior Corps, and Learn and Service America, is staffed by 271 full-time employees. The personnel budget for FY 2002 was \$29 million. Administering a larger AmeriCorps program would likely require only a modest increase in personnel, costing perhaps an additional **\$10 million** per year. Funding for the baseline level of 50,000 AmeriCorps members requires \$100 million for education grants and \$240 million for grants to civic organizations to support the members' living expense stipends. Increasing the program to 250,000 members per year would require approximately **\$400 million** in additional funds for education grants and **\$960 million** for stipends.⁴⁴
- ▶ **Peace Corps Program.** Currently, the Peace Corps is staffed by 1,000 employees worldwide. The personnel budget for FY 2002 was \$118 million. Administering a larger Peace Corps would likely require approximately **\$100 million** in additional funds for personnel per year. Funding for the current level of 6,500 Peace Corps members requires \$275 million per year. Increasing the program to involve 50,000 Americans would require approximately **\$1.8 billion** in additional funds per year.⁴⁵

Endnotes

¹ The use of the militia system was a function not only of the limited manpower and resources of the early settlers, but was also grounded in a suspicion of centralized power. This went against the prevailing military trends in Europe at the time, where monarchs used their centralized authority to build large, offensively oriented, professional standing armies. Chambers, John Whiteclay II, *To Raise an Army*, New York: The Free Press, 1987. Karsten, Peter, "The US Citizen-Soldier's Past, Present, and Likely Future," *Parameters*, Summer 2001, p. 61-73.

² With the exception of Pennsylvania (where the pacifism of the Quakers held sway), all colonial legislatures provided the personnel needed for these militias by requiring all able-bodied men to serve. Chambers, John Whiteclay II, *op. cit.*, p. 14. Mahon, John K., *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, New York: Free Press, 1983.

³ During the Revolutionary War, for example, a small Continental Army made up of enlistees recruited with market-wages for two- to three-year terms of service was supplemented by a large influx of militiamen serving on average for six months at a time. Chambers, John Whiteclay II, *op. cit.*, p. 19-21. Shapiro, Peter, "The Citizen Soldier," in *A History of National Service in America*, College Park, MD: Center for Political Leadership and Participation, 1994.

⁴ The draft laws used during the Civil War were the result of numerous compromises, including weak enforcement mechanisms and the opportunity to pay a \$300 fine to avoid service, which contributed to the small percentage of draftees. Chambers, John Whiteclay II, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁵ Chambers, John Whiteclay II, *op. cit.*, p. 141-148.

⁶ The concept of "supervised decentralization" was developed by Gen. Enoch Crowder, the Army's chief legal officer, who drew upon Brig. Gen. James Oakes' 1866 report on recommendations for improving the implementation of future drafts, as well as the wing of the progressive movement that had been advocating public policies grounded in the principles of localism, pluralism, and limited central government. Chambers, John Whiteclay II, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

⁷ Crowder quoted in Chambers, John Whiteclay II, *op. cit.*, p. 181. See also, Crowder, Enoch H., *The Spirit of Selective Service*, Garden City, NY, 1920.

⁸ Chambers, John Whiteclay II, *op. cit.* p. 186, 204, 237.

⁹ Millet, Allen, and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, New York: Free Press, 1984, p. 408.

¹⁰ Moskos, Charles, *A Call to Civic Service*, NY: The Free Press, 1988, p. 44-45.

¹¹ The blueprint for the all-volunteer force emerged out of a commission set up by President Nixon. Its conclusions were heavily influenced by conservative economists Milton Friedman and Martin Anderson, who served as members. The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (Gates Commission), Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970.

¹² The initial transition to an all-volunteer active duty force resulted in a number of problems including, for example, a sharp decline in the percent of enlistees scoring in the average and above average categories (I-III A) on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) from 60 percent to 35 percent between 1975 and 1977. However, over time, large increases in advertising, pay, and benefits helped restore the quality of enlistees to pre-1974 levels, and since the mid-1980s, this market-based system has succeeded in its mission of providing a steady stream of qualified volunteers. Department of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2000*, February 2002.

¹³ This Total Force concept emerged out of a series of policy memoranda, the first of which was signed by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970. For an overview of the concept see Philip Gold, "What the Reserves Can and Can't Do," *Public Interest* no. 75: p 47-61, Spring 1984. While succeeding in providing a low-cost alternative to the active duty force, the Reserves have proven less successful in maintaining the connection between the military and the larger society, at least in terms of population representation. For example, while 46.1 percent of 18-24 year olds in the civilian population have "some college experience" only 6.5 percent of active duty enlistees and only 6.4 percent of reserve enlistees in this same bracket have some college experience. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2000*.

¹⁴ From the beginning, this third tier of the system has struggled to fit into the mission of the all-volunteer force, with enforcement of the registration process having been consistently underfunded, the requirement itself having been allowed

to lapse from 1975 through 1980, and the mechanisms for quickly training such a large influx of personnel having never been put into place. For a discussion of the disconnect between the military's draft plans and its training base capacity, see, for example, "Army Crisis Training Plan Found Inadequate," *The New York Times*, Nov. 4, 1984, p. 27. For an overall discussion of the problems with draft registration (from a libertarian perspective), see Bandow, Doug, "Draft Registration: It's Time to Appeal Carter's Last Legacy," *Cato Policy Analysis* no. 86, 1987.

¹⁵ For a good overview of the role of new technology in war fighting, see Blaker, James R., "Understanding The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America's 21st Century Defense," Defense Working Group Paper No. 3, Progressive Policy Institute. For a more recent discussion, see also, Berkowitz, Bruce, *The New Face of War*, New York: Free Press, 2003. For a discussion of why technology alone does not determine military success, see Steven Biddle's classic examination of the first Gulf War, Biddle, Stephen, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2, Fall 1996, and his more recent examination of the War in Afghanistan, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy," Strategic Studies Institute. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/afghan/afghan.htm>.

¹⁶ Population data from the National Center for Education Statistics and Department of Defense, with assistance from Charles Moskos, Northwestern University.

¹⁷ Col. Greg Parlier, "Recruiting the Army of the Future," United States Army Recruiting Command, Jan. 28, 2002, p. 21, citing data from GAO, "Military Personnel: Services Need to Assess Efforts to Meet Recruiting Goals and Cut Attrition," June 2000.

¹⁸ Per capita manpower costs for 1964 and 1999 are found in Moskos, Charles, "What Ails the All-Volunteer Force: An Institutional Perspective," *Parameters*, Summer 2001, p 29-47. The per capita cost for 1986 is found in Moskos, Charles C., *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community*, New York: The Free Press, 1988, p. 131, and recalculated for constant 1999 dollars by the author with 1999 dollars computed as 1.5 of 1986 dollars.

¹⁹ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The United States Reserve Forces - A Value Added Force*, November 2001. <http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/ondemand/reserves101.ppt>. For a discussion of the impact of strains on our reserve force before Sept 11., see, for example, Graham, Bradley and Eric Pianin, "Military Readiness, Moral Show Strain: Budgets Contract, Deployments Expand," *The Washington Post*, A01, August 13, 1998.

²⁰ The total number of National Guard and Reserve personnel on active duty as of June 4, 2003, was 215,171. Department of Defense, News Release, June 4, 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20030604-0078.html>. For a discussion of the strains created by the mobilization in effect since Sept. 11, see, for example, Zoroya, Gregg, "Citizen soldiers report long tours, little support," *USA Today*, Jan. 1, 2003, 1A. For a general discussion of our overstretched military see, for example, Confessore, Nicholas, "G.I. Woe," *The Washington Monthly*, March 2003.

²¹ Moniz, Dave, "Guard, Reserve Short on Recruits," *USA Today*, June 10, 2003; 1A.

²² For example, in the Army, 100 percent of Chemical Brigades, Medical Groups, Railway Units, and Water Supply Battalions, and 97 percent of Civil Affairs Brigades, 89 percent of Psychological Operations Units, 80 percent of Transportation Groups, 78 percent of Motor Battalions, 55 percent of Petroleum Battalions, and 40 percent of Public Affairs Units, are found in the Reserve force. Office of the Chief Army Reserve, "About the Army Reserve - A Federal Force," Jan. 24, 2003. <http://www.army.mil/usar/aboutus.html>.

²³ For an in-depth discussion of the citizen soldier option, see Magee, Marc and Steven Nider, "Citizen Soldiers and the War on Terror," PPI Policy Report, December 2002. For benchmarks on how to scale up this new program, see Magee, Marc and Steven Nider, "Uncle Sam Wants You! ... For 18 Months: Benchmarks for a Successful Citizen Soldier Program," PPI Policy Brief, March 2003.

²⁴ Survey research by military sociologist Charles Moskos of Northwestern University suggests that the greatest barrier to enlistment among the two-thirds of Americans that continue their education after high school is the military's exclusive use of long-term career track enlistments. While these long-term enlistments, together with larger bonuses and higher wages, have proven effective at bringing high school graduates into military service, they have proven much less effective in encouraging enlistments from college bound youth. For example, Moskos found that college students said military enlistment was "very likely" or "possible" in far greater numbers in response to an 18-month enlistment with a \$15,000 education scholarship than with the current option of a four-year enlistment with a \$60,000 education scholarship. For more details, see Magee, Marc and Steven Nider, "Citizen Soldiers and the War on Terror," PPI Policy Report, December 2002. This approach would also provide a cost effective way to shift critical skills from the reserve

force to the active duty force. There are four basic reasons why this approach would be more cost-effective than the status quo. First, recruitment would be based on the preexisting draft registration process, greatly reducing the recruitment costs of the current system (\$10,000 per enlistee and rising). Second, since it would be designed around short-term enlistments, wages could be set at subsistence level, rather than the market wages of career-track positions. Third, the high costs of benefits for dependents could be more easily controlled by limiting this short-term of service to young Americans without dependents, which is not possible with an exclusively career-track system. Fourth, there would be significant cost savings from the lower attrition rates of short-term enlistees. For more details, see Magee, Marc and Steven Nider, "Citizen Soldiers and the War on Terror," PPI Policy Report, December 2002.

²⁵ Corporation for National Service, Press Release, "White House and Corporation for National and Community Service Announce New Grants to Involve Volunteers in Homeland Security Grants to support more than 37,000 volunteers nationwide," July 18, 2002.

²⁶ Magee, Marc, "A U-turn on National Service? Bush Promised Expansion, but Republicans in Congress Deliver a Cut," PPI Policy Background, February 2003. Magee, Marc, "National Service Shrinking on Bush's Watch," PPI Front & Center, May 2003.

²⁷ The debate over how best to change the conditions that breed terror is a complicated one that will continue to evolve in the coming years as further research is conducted on this issue. It is already clear that the idea that poverty causes terrorism, especially the kind of international terrorism represented by al Qaeda, is too simplistic and not supported by the facts. For example, most of the hijackers that took part in the Sept. 11 attacks were from middle- or upper-middle class families and many held advanced degrees (although these degrees appear to have been little help in finding employment in their home countries). Further, research by Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova suggests that supporters of terrorism in the Middle East are if anything more affluent and better educated than average. An emerging consensus suggests that the problem is one not of poor people, but underglobalized nations lacking economies integrated into the global market system and stable, representative governments. For a discussion of the role of trade policy in helping to correct this problem, see, for example, Gresser, Edward, "Draining The Swamp: A Middle East Trade Policy to Win the Peace," PPI Policy Report, January 2002. For a discussion of the role of aid in encouraging democracy, see, for example, Carothers, Thomas, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999.

²⁸ Critical to this strategy is a recognition that the threat possessed by militant Islam, and other forms of terrorism that may emerge down the road, is different than previous threats faced by the United States. As Joshua Micah Marshall put it recently, "Unlike fascism or communism, militant Islam isn't a rising power, but a threat precisely because of its dysfunction and weakness." See, "The Orwell Temptation: Are intellectuals overthinking the Middle East?" *The Washington Monthly*, May 2003.

²⁹ See "About the Peace Corps: History," www.peacecorps.gov.

³⁰ For example, when volunteers are surveyed on how they got involved in their current volunteering activity, the most common answer is, "Someone asked me." For a discussion of the role of "being asked" in increasing participation in volunteering activities see Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 121, 463-464 (notes 19 and 20).

³¹ One sign of the failure of the current system to do so is the steady decline over the last three decades in the percentage of enlistees saying that they joined out of duty to country, from about 50 percent before the creation of the all-volunteer force to less than 10 percent today. Data from the Pentagon's Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS), cited in Owens, Admiral Bill, *Lifting the Fog of War*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 50.

³² The effort to transform the Selective Service System into a more comprehensive system of national service can be traced back to WWI. Soon after the Selective Service System was created on May 18, 1917, articles appeared in prominent magazines advocating the creation of a broader national service system that would encompass both military and civilian service connected to the war effort. Legislation authorizing the federal government to develop a national service system was introduced in Congress in 1918. However, strong opposition from labor unions undermined support for the measure and it eventually died in committee. For more information on this period see Chambers, John Whiteclay II, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

The all-volunteer force's recruiting difficulties in the late 1970s and early 1980s, along with emerging civilian needs, led to a resurgence in efforts to create a national service system. An early blueprint was put forth in Charles C. Moskos' "Making the All-Volunteer Force Work: A National Service Approach," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 60, 1981. These ideas were revisited and expanded in Will Marshall's *Citizenship and National Service: A Blueprint for Civic Enterprise*, Washington, DC: Democratic Leadership Council, 1988. The work of Moskos and Marshall was put into legislative form in the

“Citizenship and National Service Act of 1989”, sponsored in the Senate by Sen. Sam Nunn (S. 3) and in the House of Representatives by Rep. Dave McCurdy (H.R. 660), which contained the basic outlines for what became the AmeriCorps program in 1993 and the short-term “citizen soldier” enlistment program in 2002.

The effort to connect these national service programs to the Selective Service System can be traced back to 1993, when, at the request of Sen. Barbara Mikulski, the Selective Service System began exploring avenues of interagency cooperation with the Department of Defense and the Corporation for National Service. One program that grew out of this cooperation was the mailing of National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC) recruiting materials on a reimbursable basis by the SSS. A series of meetings between former Sen. Harris Wofford, then CEO of the Corporation for National Service, and Gil Coronado, then director of the SSS, resulted in the Service to America Initiative, which was included in President Clinton’s FY 1996 budget. The proposal would have modified the SSS registration acknowledgement cards to include information on service in the U.S. Armed Forces and AmeriCorps. However, congressional Republicans killed this initiative in committee.

³³ Those who choose the “registration only” option would be subject to a future military draft as is defined by law under the current system. The civilian service programs would not be part of this draft, although they could be offered as service options for conscientious objectors.

³⁴ These levels would require increasing the current AmeriCorps education grant of \$4,725 for one year of full-time service, which has not changed in 10 years, to keep pace with increases in the cost of college. It would also require the creation of a \$9,000 education award, which could be offered as an alternative to the current \$5,000 cash stipend awarded to Peace Corps members at the end of their two year, full-time terms of service. The smaller per-year size of the Peace Corps education award is designed to partially offset the greater per-member costs of an international service program.

³⁵ This preference could be modeled on the veterans preference in civil service applications. To reflect the greater risk inherent in military service, those who choose service in the Armed Forces could be provided with additional consideration. Participation by colleges and university would, of course, be voluntary.

³⁶ Currently, 71 percent of AmeriCorps members, 61 percent of Peace Corps members, and 15 percent of the members of the Armed Forces are women. The percentage of women in the Armed Forces has risen steadily since the creation of the all-volunteer force in 1973, when only 2 percent of members of the Armed Forces were women.

³⁷ In the landmark case *Rostker v. Goldberg* (543 U.S. 57) in 1981 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling and upheld the constitutionality of excluding women from draft registration largely on the past reliance of the draft to provide ground combat troops for the Army and the DOD’s policy of excluding women from these combat roles. For a review of the historical developments regarding women and the draft, see, for example, GAO/NSIAD-98-199, Appendix I: Historical Perspectives on Women and the Draft, in “Gender Issues: Changes Would Be Needed to Expand Selective Service Registration to Women,” United States General Accounting Office.

³⁸ As of FY 1998, 91 percent of Army occupations were open to women (70 percent of positions), 96 percent of Navy occupations were open to women (94 percent of positions), 93 percent Marine Corps occupations were open to women (62 percent of positions), and 99 percent of Air Force occupations open to women (99 percent of positions). United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, “Gender Issues: Trends in the Occupational Distribution of Military Women,” September 1999.

³⁹ President Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002.

⁴⁰ All polls cited in Appendix II can be found in Bowman, Karlyn, “Attitudes about National Service,” AEI Studies in Public Opinion, May 20, 2003, except for the 2002 Penn/Schoen/Berland poll, which can be found in Penn, Mark, “How Americans Feel About Politics After 9/11,” Blueprint, January 2003.

⁴¹ “About the Agency: Quick Facts and Figures,” Selective Service System, February 24, 2003. <http://www.sss.gov/quick.htm>.

⁴² In 1998 the GAO estimated that including women in the registration process would cost an additional \$5 million per year. The figure of an additional \$25 million per year is composed of the extra \$5 million for expanding registration to women, an additional \$10 million per year to support the recruiting functions of this new agency, and an additional \$10 million to support the grants to communities for holding annual service ceremonies. GAO/NSIAD-98-199, “Gender Issues: Changes Would Be Needed to Expand Selective Service Registration to Women,” United States General Accounting Office.

⁴³ Using the rule that any job with a training program of five months or less should be available to short-term enlistees, about one-third of all enlisted jobs in the Armed Forces—roughly 400,000—could be included in the citizen soldier program. About one-third of these positions are entry level (E-1 through E-3), which means that about 135,000 positions in these job categories are available for citizen soldier enlistees. Since these short-term recruits serve for about a year and a half, this means the current force structure could support about 90,000 citizen soldier recruits per year. Magee, Marc and Steven Nider, “Uncle Sam Wants You! ... For 18 Months: Benchmarks for a Successful Citizen Soldier Program,” PPI Policy Brief, March 2003.

⁴⁴ Facts and figures for AmeriCorps’ budget calculated by the author using information from “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, Appendix: Other Independent Agencies,” Office of Management and Budget, p. 1015-1018. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/>.

⁴⁵ Facts and figures for the Peace Corps’ budget calculated by the author using information from “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, Appendix: International Assistance Programs,” Office of Management and Budget, p. 943-944. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/>.